“There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq.” So begins the Iraq Study Group report, before offering a series of incantations which, if the international community repeats them all together, might just bring about peace.

In recent years there has been a mania for the independent or bipartisan commission. The 9/11 Commission is a prominent example, whose report has taken on a sacred aura and given politicians a useful means of avoiding proposing their own policies. The conceit behind such commissions is that people who are temporarily out of government but who have made careers in government and now subsist on being professional former government officials will somehow rise above politics and achieve a level of intellectual clarity that those involved in the day to day of the policy world cannot.

Nice theory. But the long-awaited Iraq Study Group report proves that not only can such commissions be as subject to policy pressures as people inside government, but that a distinguished group of public intellectuals can piece together a document that is a conceptual mish-mash, a collective wish, hoping the rest of the world will play along.

The document has 79 specific recommendations of greater and lesser importance — but more on them later. Begin where the group began. They describe the problem; Iraq, liberated, but unstable. Overrun by various types of violent groups, beset by a corrupt and divided government, unable to get its economy going, and interfered with by its neighbors. How did it get this way? The document does not lay blame on the U.S. directly, though the “de-Baathification” ordered in May 2003 comes in for explicit criticism. Rather, it is the result of various sects and groups pursuing their interests through the use of force.

The descriptive section of the report is fairly straightforward. We are told that Iraq has a government that reflects the will of the Iraqi people. But we are also told that the composition of the government is basically sectarian, and key players act in the interests of their sects, which thwarts the people’s will. Solution? They should stop doing that. Why? Well, no answer given, but it’s the right thing to do. The word “should” is frequently abused in this document — used 182 times — a normative command not backed up by much reasoning. The Iranians should stop giving support to the insurgency. Why? No reason, but it would be nice, wouldn’t it? The word “must” is abused the same way, 69 times. Shiite leaders must demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must seek peaceful resolution of their issues. Tribal leaders must aggressively pursue al Qaeda. But why must they? Why is this in their interest? What is the penalty if they do not? On the other hand, words that suggest penalties or enforcement, such as compel, force (as a verb), enforce, or coerce, do not appear at all.

The ISG places its faith for the future in a diplomatic effort, the New Diplomatic Offensive (pretentious caps in original), which will be undertaken by something called the Iraq International Support Group. Members of this body will include Iraq, all the key states in the region (including Iran and Syria but not Israel), the European Union, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, other states that might want to contribute, and of course Iraq. I know I mentioned Iraq as a member twice, but so does the report (p. 49). Why would these countries want to be involved? Hard to say. What will they do? “Develop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account [their] interests, perspectives and potential contributions.” In other words, establish a process and peace will follow. Build it, they will come. The authors state that “violence cannot end unless dialogue begins,” but there are numerous examples in history of violence ending without dialogue, something called victory. Incidentally the word “victory” only appears in the document in the context of al Qaeda’s perceptions of what a US pullout would mean to them. In other words the only victory scenario mentioned in the study is a terrorist triumph.

On the matter of the Iraqization of the security situation, the document is somewhat confusing. It argues that if the Iraqis do well at reaching milestones on reconciliation, security, and governance, we will continue support until such time as our troop presence can safely be reduced. If the government does not make progress, we will reduce support right away, thus realizing the worst-case scenarios that the report had previously warned us about. The document lays out some milestones for achieving this — handover control of Iraqi army by April 2007, and achieving self-reliance with some U.S. support by December 2007. Yet, later the authors state that they oppose timetables or deadlines for withdrawal. Still later, they say that all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq by the first quarter of 2008. So, take your pick. Timelines are not a bad thing; they create incentives that an open-ended commitment will not. As the saying goes, the prospect of being hanged at dawn tends to focus the mind. The only reason the Iraqis have a constitution and an elected government today is that the United States forced them to follow a schedule for completion. The old mantra that “we will stand down as they stand up” places ultimate control in the hands of the Iraqis, and they have been less willing to stand up as they have discovered you might get shot. So absent a timeline, we will be stuck there.

The most glaring intellectual failure is on page 27. In the same paragraph, in adjoining sentences, we are told that “no country in the region wants a chaotic Iraq,” yet “some [neighboring countries] are undercutting its stability.” So we are to believe that the countries engaged in promoting instability are doing so because they don’t want a chaotic Iraq? Or that they are consciously acting against their own interests but can’t help themselves? This is the key, and in my mind fatal flaw of the report, the unwillingness to accept the fact that for some countries in the region, particularly Iran and Syria, there are positive benefits to the status quo of Iraqi instability. This notion is repeated throughout the document, and never quite explained. Indeed, if things got worse for us it could well be better for them. On page 33 the report notes that “chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests.” One could more correctly say that it is intervention to protect their own interests that has lead to chaos in Iraq. And while the report does acknowledge that no states in the region would like to see “aggrandized regional influence by Iran,” in the nearby discussion of Iranian interests the report fails to state that this is exactly what the Iranians are pursuing.

Why is it in the interest of Iran and Syria to create instability in Iraq? First, to keep Iraq weak, to keep it from becoming a threat to them again; that is, to increase their relative power and influence in the region. Secondly, to punish and embarrass the United States. Let’s face it, they do not like America, and supporting the insurgency in Iraq is the easiest, least expensive, least risky and most effective way of hurting us. So long as our troops are there, Iran and Syria will contribute to their death and maiming. Third, a destabilized Iraq draws attention away from their other activities in the region. Things like Hezbollah’s aggressiveness in Lebanon, which they underwrite. It is hardly a coincidence that they are making their move now while the United States is perceived to be weak. As well, it distracts attention from the Iranian nuclear program. This points to one of the ISG report’s most critical deficiencies, namely writing the Iranian nuclear program out of the envisioned grand regional settlement. The ISG dismissed this issue peremptorily, saying the U.N. should take care of it. Too tough to do. Save it for some other time. While you are at it, stop talking about regime change in Iran and start talking about “reform.”

Yet, the report also says that a lasting solution to the Iraq problem cannot be achieved without also solving all the outstanding Arab issues concerning Israel. A Palestinian state should be created and supported, and the “right of return” discussed. Syria should be given back the Golan Heights. In return, there is a wish list of things Syria should be required to attempt to do, including encouraging Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to exist, something Syria itself does not recognize. I won’t get into a deconstruction of the authors and question their motives in trying to saddle Israel with an unacceptable list of demands. I will however question their political judgment. Setting aside the fact that these issues have nothing whatsoever to do with Iraq, if the Study Group believes that the Iraq issue cannot be solved without settling the authors call the Arab-Israeli dispute, then any attempt to deal with Iraq is doomed. As well, linking the Golan Heights and Palestinian “right of return” to the Iraq issue as part of a regional grand design, and simultaneously de-linking the Iranian nuclear program and an end to the rule of the mullahs is a mark of the ISG’s ultimate intellectual decrepitude.

A coherent strategy would take a more realist approach, recognizing the true interests and motives in the region and building structures based on their commonalities. King Abdullah II of Jordan noted over a year ago the emergence of a “Shiite crescent” stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean, and the threat it posed to the countries in the region. Fear of Iranian expansion will be the greatest motivator of the countries bordering Iraq; and this cannot but affect the situation inside the country as contestants from all sides seek to use their proxies to further their interests.

Rewarding Iran and Syria for their complicity in opposing the Coalition in Iraq will only embolden them. Iran and Syria will negotiate, participate, they will take all they can get, while stepping up support for the insurgents in Iraq and pressing their claims on Lebanon through their proxy Hezbollah. And, ultimately, they know we will leave. Some day, in late 2007, early 2008, sooner or later, the U.S. will depart, and they will be there ready to fill the vacuum. Meanwhile the diplomats will talk and Iraq, the U.S. and other Coalition countries will bleed. “Miracles cannot be expected,” the report notes, but it would take one for this plan to succeed.

– James S. Robbins is senior fellow in national-security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, a trustee for the Leaders for Liberty Foundation, and author of Last in Their Class: Custer, Picket and the Goats of West Point. Robbins is also an NRO contributor.