Russia–Ukraine War: How Does It End?

In April of 2002, just a few months into what would become our 20-year war in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent out a mem o. He was disturbed. “The fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me,” he wrote. Toward the end of the memo, he started asking questions, and finished off: “We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave. Help!”

We never found a source of stability for Afghanistan. We wouldn’t or couldn’t bring ourselves to confront Pakistan, which harbored, supported, and in some cases funded the Taliban in all the years we were driving them back. Why? Because the risks of destabilizing a nuclear-armed power that could itself fall under Islamist radicals was too great. Arguably we had achieved most of our major war aims — dismantling al-Qaeda and punishing the Taliban in the first two years of the war. But we went on as if trying to win one news cycle to the next, to one general’s paradigm, to another’s, vindicating one presidential approach or another. Billions were spent producing charts and graphs to demonstrate American “progress.” Money spent, territory cleared, hearts and minds won, schools opened — but never movement toward a firm or realistic geopolitical end. A similar refusal to ask and answer the basic questions dogged our missions in Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

About the Author

Michael Brendan Dougherty

Michael Brendan Dougherty is a senior writer at National Review Online.

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In April of 2002, just a few months into what would become our 20-year war in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent out a mem o. He was disturbed. “The fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me,” he wrote. Toward the end of the memo, he started asking questions, and finished off: “We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave. Help!”

We never found a source of stability for Afghanistan. We wouldn’t or couldn’t bring ourselves to confront Pakistan, which harbored, supported, and in some cases funded the Taliban in all the years we were driving them back. Why? Because the risks of destabilizing a nuclear-armed power that could itself fall under Islamist radicals was too great. Arguably we had achieved most of our major war aims — dismantling al-Qaeda and punishing the Taliban in the first two years of the war. But we went on as if trying to win one news cycle to the next, to one general’s paradigm, to another’s, vindicating one presidential approach or another. Billions were spent producing charts and graphs to demonstrate American “progress.” Money spent, territory cleared, hearts and minds won, schools opened — but never movement toward a firm or realistic geopolitical end. A similar refusal to ask and answer the basic questions dogged our missions in Libya, Syria, and Iraq.