Iraq & Syria: Foreign-Policy Lessons Learned, and Forgotten

Seventeen years on, we have some idea of why the Iraq War was such a disaster. The reasons for failure have been debated over and over in the media, in academia, and by politicians. A narrative has emerged that identifies many of the major mistakes made before and during the war. Meanwhile, advocates for intervention in the Syrian conflict have made a case that is disconnected entirely from the emerging consensus over what went wrong in Iraq. The manner in which many advocates of the Iraq War, and even some of its opponents, argued for intervention in Syria suggested they were not eager to apply the key lessons learned in Iraq. A misguided understanding of what might have happened if the U.S. had intervened earlier on behalf of anti-government rebels continues to shape the debate over Syria. This remains relevant given Turkey’s recent intervention on behalf of rebels, in Syria’s northwest, against Bashar al-Assad’s government. That move was met with approval in some corners of Washington, D.C. Those who have advocated that the U.S. support rebels in Syria would do well to consider the lessons we should have learned in Iraq.

The U.S. assumed three major justifications for invading Iraq in 2003: Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government had supported and collaborated with terrorists; Iraq had weapons of massive destruction; and spreading democracy in the region would undermine the political conditions that fomented popular discontent and thereby caused terrorism. By the time American troops withdrew from the country at the end of 2011, it had been clear for some time that all three justifications were based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the country we had invaded. As the U.S. left, Iraq was run by a barely functioning, democratic-in-name-only, sectarian government; we realized Saddam’s connection to terrorists involved in 9/11 were tangential at best; and, by the time we invaded, Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. A few years after our withdrawal, ISIS took over large swathes of the country, along with significant territory in neighboring Syria. The war was counterproductive even in its stated objectives to combat terrorism and spread democracy.

About the Author

Sam Sweeney

Sam Sweeney, a writer based in the Middle East, is the president of Mesopotamia Relief Foundation, which works in northeastern Syria.

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Seventeen years on, we have some idea of why the Iraq War was such a disaster. The reasons for failure have been debated over and over in the media, in academia, and by politicians. A narrative has emerged that identifies many of the major mistakes made before and during the war. Meanwhile, advocates for intervention in the Syrian conflict have made a case that is disconnected entirely from the emerging consensus over what went wrong in Iraq. The manner in which many advocates of the Iraq War, and even some of its opponents, argued for intervention in Syria suggested they were not eager to apply the key lessons learned in Iraq. A misguided understanding of what might have happened if the U.S. had intervened earlier on behalf of anti-government rebels continues to shape the debate over Syria. This remains relevant given Turkey’s recent intervention on behalf of rebels, in Syria’s northwest, against Bashar al-Assad’s government. That move was met with approval in some corners of Washington, D.C. Those who have advocated that the U.S. support rebels in Syria would do well to consider the lessons we should have learned in Iraq.

The U.S. assumed three major justifications for invading Iraq in 2003: Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government had supported and collaborated with terrorists; Iraq had weapons of massive destruction; and spreading democracy in the region would undermine the political conditions that fomented popular discontent and thereby caused terrorism. By the time American troops withdrew from the country at the end of 2011, it had been clear for some time that all three justifications were based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the country we had invaded. As the U.S. left, Iraq was run by a barely functioning, democratic-in-name-only, sectarian government; we realized Saddam’s connection to terrorists involved in 9/11 were tangential at best; and, by the time we invaded, Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. A few years after our withdrawal, ISIS took over large swathes of the country, along with significant territory in neighboring Syria. The war was counterproductive even in its stated objectives to combat terrorism and spread democracy.