Conservatism & Christianity: The ‘Dangerous Inversion’

Writing in the New York Times, my colleague Nate Hochman argues that the era of what we used to call the Religious Right has passed. There are a half a dozen minor points that I might argue with in his essay, but it seems to me that he is entirely correct to observe that “the new coalition is focused on questions of national identity, social integrity, and political alienation.” He goes on to note that:

What has happened is that the Christian sense of collective identity has persisted even among those hollowed-out Christians who have abandoned Christian orthodoxy, reducing the Christian confession to a demographic box to check, one of many constituent parts of an American “national identity.” Never mind, for the moment, that one of the hallmarks of the authentic American identity is approaching Christian orthodoxy and Christian observance with a seriousness that brushes up against fanaticism: The story of the United States does not begin with the arrival of the first slave, as the 1619 Project would argue, but with the arrival of the first Separatist. And never mind that the American credo is a theological proposition (“endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights”). The Christianity of politically engaged Christians is vague, but this vague sense of Christianity will do well enough to bolster equally vague notions of tradition and national identity. Modern Americans have long preferred vagueness and sentimentality to the clarity of theology or the rigors of ideology, which is why Kirkian conservatism (“the negation of ideology”) remains the most long-enduring habit and first instinct of American political thought.

About the Author

Kevin D. Williamson

Kevin D. Williamson is a former fellow at National Review Institute and a former roving correspondent for National Review.

Featured Tags

Writing in the New York Times, my colleague Nate Hochman argues that the era of what we used to call the Religious Right has passed. There are a half a dozen minor points that I might argue with in his essay, but it seems to me that he is entirely correct to observe that “the new coalition is focused on questions of national identity, social integrity, and political alienation.” He goes on to note that:

What has happened is that the Christian sense of collective identity has persisted even among those hollowed-out Christians who have abandoned Christian orthodoxy, reducing the Christian confession to a demographic box to check, one of many constituent parts of an American “national identity.” Never mind, for the moment, that one of the hallmarks of the authentic American identity is approaching Christian orthodoxy and Christian observance with a seriousness that brushes up against fanaticism: The story of the United States does not begin with the arrival of the first slave, as the 1619 Project would argue, but with the arrival of the first Separatist. And never mind that the American credo is a theological proposition (“endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights”). The Christianity of politically engaged Christians is vague, but this vague sense of Christianity will do well enough to bolster equally vague notions of tradition and national identity. Modern Americans have long preferred vagueness and sentimentality to the clarity of theology or the rigors of ideology, which is why Kirkian conservatism (“the negation of ideology”) remains the most long-enduring habit and first instinct of American political thought.