U.S. Military Presence in Somalia Unnecessary

President Joe Biden’s May 16 decision to redeploy hundreds of U.S. special-operations forces into Somalia should not have come as a surprise. Despite months of inter-agency deliberation, it was abundantly clear that the Biden administration thought former president Donald Trump’s December 2020 order to withdraw from the Horn of Africa nation was a precipitous move based more on ticking off a campaign promise than on what best served the national interests of the U.S. Those views were even more hardened in the Pentagon; testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, U.S. AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend faulted the lack of a U.S. ground presence in Somalia on a more resilient al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s most lethal affiliate in Africa.

What General Townsend neglects to mention, however, is that Washington has been able to successfully manage the threat al-Shabaab poses to the U.S. without having to station U.S. personnel on the ground. This is borne out by the fact that there hasn’t been a single al-Shabaab attack perpetrated against U.S. interests in the year and a half since the Trump administration pulled U.S. forces from Somalia. Part of this is because the U.S. counterterrorism community has developed into a highly proficient terrorist-killing machine, where targets can be neutralized without having to place U.S. personnel close to the front line. But another reason is that al-Shabaab is more interested in local objectives than planning a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. The group’s leadership is aware of the power and breadth of the U.S. intelligence and military apparatus, which has proven time and again why a direct assault against the U.S. is a bad bet for terrorists. Look no further than al-Qaeda, whose founder, Osama bin Laden, practically put targets on the backs of his followers the moment he green-lit the so-called “planes operation.” For al-Shabaab to follow the same path and risk extreme retaliation from the U.S. military would undermine the organization’s dream of establishing control over Somalia.

About the Author

Daniel R. DePetris

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

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President Joe Biden’s May 16 decision to redeploy hundreds of U.S. special-operations forces into Somalia should not have come as a surprise. Despite months of inter-agency deliberation, it was abundantly clear that the Biden administration thought former president Donald Trump’s December 2020 order to withdraw from the Horn of Africa nation was a precipitous move based more on ticking off a campaign promise than on what best served the national interests of the U.S. Those views were even more hardened in the Pentagon; testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, U.S. AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend faulted the lack of a U.S. ground presence in Somalia on a more resilient al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s most lethal affiliate in Africa.

What General Townsend neglects to mention, however, is that Washington has been able to successfully manage the threat al-Shabaab poses to the U.S. without having to station U.S. personnel on the ground. This is borne out by the fact that there hasn’t been a single al-Shabaab attack perpetrated against U.S. interests in the year and a half since the Trump administration pulled U.S. forces from Somalia. Part of this is because the U.S. counterterrorism community has developed into a highly proficient terrorist-killing machine, where targets can be neutralized without having to place U.S. personnel close to the front line. But another reason is that al-Shabaab is more interested in local objectives than planning a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. The group’s leadership is aware of the power and breadth of the U.S. intelligence and military apparatus, which has proven time and again why a direct assault against the U.S. is a bad bet for terrorists. Look no further than al-Qaeda, whose founder, Osama bin Laden, practically put targets on the backs of his followers the moment he green-lit the so-called “planes operation.” For al-Shabaab to follow the same path and risk extreme retaliation from the U.S. military would undermine the organization’s dream of establishing control over Somalia.