fEven with a temporary timeout, the international community is hamstrung to find a solution to the war raging in the Mideast. In the spirit of peace, President George W. Bush hosted Prime Minister Tony Blair in Washington Friday.

The two agreed that the top priorities included humanitarian relief and striving to achieve an end to violence. Bush said the goal was to achieve a “lasting peace.” But the lack of concrete pressure on Israel put forth by the U.S. and the U.K. is not a surprise. The positions of these two leaders are particularly complicated as both have troops in Iraq, and what happens next in Lebanon will also have an impact on the resolve of the Iraqi insurgency. The last thing Bush and Blair want to do is give the Iraqi terrorists more reason to resist and recruit.

The decision by Israel to enter Lebanon with ground forces and engage the Hezbollah has changed the strategic dynamic of the fight. As long as Israel was launching rocket and using airplanes, ending hostilities early was more doable. At this point, the consequences are broader.

First, if Israel withdraws now under pressure Hezbollah will sell it as their victory — as a victory of Islam over Israel. This will for one embolden the insurgents and Islamic radicals in Iraq fighting the U.S. and British troops. The numbers of available suicide bombers and resistance fighters will almost certainly increase, as will the frequency of the attacks on American and British troops. Both Bush and Blair are under pressure domestically to cut their losses and move out of Iraq, which is something that will be impossible if insurgency in Iraq picks up.

Second, a premature withdrawal by Israel from Lebanon will help convince the hardliners in the Hamas government that negotiating with Israel is not worth it. In turn, this will put pressure on the Prime Minister, Ismail Naniya, and probably block the process of transformation of the Hamas into a legitimate political party.

Thirdly, the Israeli domestic scene should be kept in mind. If Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pulls back now, while there are still no apparent military successes to sell off at home, his domestic support will plunder. There will be blame from both sides; by those that disagreed with the act of war in the first place and those that will blame Olmert for laving too early. In both case he will be blamed for making Israel even more vulnerable. In fact, public outcry could have devastating consequences for the future of Kadima and the third-way political option of Israel. This is bad news in terms of cyclical progression in the Israeli political process.

Finally, a heavy military campaign against the Hezbollah — provided there is a clear exist strategy in sight — may be the best way to weaken the organization so as to make it vulnerable to political and other non-military asymmetric pressures. The fact is that Hezbollah was not being integrated into the Lebanese political system successfully, while the disarming of the group never really took place. Since the departure of Israel and Syria from Lebanon, Hezbollah actually strengthened its military wing — thanks in large part also to Iran.

The Bush-Blair mini-summit was a good first meeting. For the follow-up, two objectives will be of key importance. First, a framework should be put in place which will minimize the chances of this military campaign from spilling beyond Lebanon’s borders and impacting the commodities markets. To an extent, the international force proposed by Bush and Blair is a step in the right direction in terms of meeting this objective.

Second, Israel should be offered a grand bargain in exchange for pulling back. The grand bargain should include NATO security guarantees and comprehensive Security Council sanctions against Iran and Syria, as the two are the main culprits in this problem. Under this deal, Olmert would have a chance to save face domestically, and second, the political check for the war would be offloaded squarely on the shoulders of Iran and Syria. Because of the nature of the Security Council discussions, such an offer also gives Israel some additional time to inflict irreversible damage to the Hezbollah military wing.

A ceasefire at this point is no longer the solution in Lebanon and Bush and Blair were right to insist on creating the conditions for a comprehensive peace; the two are not exactly the same thing. Without dealing with Syria and Iran, the problem of Hezbollah will never go away.

— Borut Grgic is the director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana, and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.