The argument that Republicans should “pull the plug” on Trump—should, that is, concentrate on winning congressional races rather than the presidency—has gotten mixed up with the raging arguments among them over Trump’s personality and views. But at this point, the case for making the congressional races a priority does not require opposition to Trump as a premise.

The basic case is instead the same one that convinced Republicans to perform the same maneuver in 1996: The presidential candidate is highly unlikely to win; congressional majorities can still be salvaged; and directly helping congressional Republicans in difficult races is more likely to help them than trying to shore up the presidential nominee.

On that last point: It is certainly true that the better Trump does, the better Republican House and Senate candidates are likely to do. But that fact does not obviate the need to make specific tradeoffs. When Republicans identify voters in New Hampshire who are likely to vote for both Hillary Clinton and Republican senator Kelly Ayotte, for example, should they invest in turning them out? The two Republican campaigns have different interests when it comes to answering this question. Should Republicans spend time and money turning out their voters in the second and fourth congressional districts of Iowa, who aren’t voting in competitive House and Senate races but who could help Trump win the state? Or should they redirect those resources to other places in the country where they could help Republican candidates for the House and Senate?

In 1996, Republicans decided to argue that a Republican Congress was necessary as a check on President Clinton: a message that presupposed that Clinton was likely to be re-elected. And they directed resources toward preserving their congressional majorities. Republicans did these things even though they largely liked and respected the Republican nominee, Bob Dole, and even though he was ideologically in sync with them. They took these steps notwithstanding the risk that Republicans would stay home once the presidential race was effectively conceded.

There are two differences this time that are keeping Republicans from cutting Trump loose. First, they fear that there is a “Trump vote” where there was no “Dole vote.” Second, they knew that Dole would not tell his supporters to vote against congressional Republicans, and they fear that Trump will. (He and his aides have already attacked Paul Ryan for distancing himself from Trump.) The risk, then, is that they will lose even more Republican votes than they would just because the presidential race is effectively over.

This concern is an argument for Republicans to refrain from denouncing Trump. It’s an argument for continuing to endorse them. Perhaps it’s even an argument that defeats the ones for criticizing him and for rescinding endorsements. But it’s not an argument for putting resources behind him. Cutting off Trump is exactly the decision that Trump himself would make if he were evaluating it as an RNC official, or looking at it as a businessman. It’s what Republicans, even those who wish Trump could win, should do now.