Take a look at this piece from Council on Foreign Relations fellow, Michael Levi, at The New Republic Online: “That’s Rich: Iran Oversells Its Nuclear Progress.” Then compare it to this Council On Foreign Relations interview with David Albright, an expert Levi relies on in his piece. Levi, it seems to me, is clearly underselling the danger that even this dovish nuclear expert concedes.

Drawing on Albright’s calculation of the current rate at which Iran’s centrifuges are working, Levi estimates that it would take five years for Iran to produce enough material for a bomb. But Levi barely considers the obvious likelihood that Iran’s processing will grow more efficient with time. Indeed, Albright (the very expert Levi is relying on) says that Iran is likely to get better at processing. Above all, Levi fails to note Albright’s own estimate that Iran could have enough fuel for a bomb by 2009–not five years from now, but two. True, Albright acknowledges that it could well take Iran longer than two years. Yet Albright is also clear that, despite Ahmadinejad’s current posturing and exaggeration, it is realistic to think that Iran could have enough material for a bomb by 2009.

So Levi omits to mention the most crucial estimate from the very expert he pretends to rely on. Instead of actually telling us what Albright’s worst-case scenario is (two years), Levi says, “…we shouldn’t let worst-case fears that lack hard evidence dominate our policymaking.”

Really? Imagine that the Iranians expel the U.N. inspectors and repudiate the non-proliferation treaty. We would then lack any hard evidence on Iran’s nuclear progress. Yet we could be certain that after that act of expulsion, the Iranians would be racing against time (especially against the election of a new American president) to produce enough material for a weapon. Even short of expulsion, there are limits to what the inspectors are permitted to see at Natanz. And that’s not counting the real possibility that the Iranians have other, more secret, enrichment facilities.

Given the uncertainties, and given the stakes, can we really afford to let hopeful scenarios guide our policy? Considering Iran’s open defiance, and its clear commitment to build a bomb, wouldn’t the most prudent and sensible policy be to act on the assumption that it is too dangerous to get to 2009 without stopping Iran? If even a dovish nuclear expert, dead-set against military action, sees 2009 as a realistic possible date for an Iranian bomb, shouldn’t we sit up and take notice?

Certainly, as Albright says, it may take Iran longer than two years to get the material for a bomb. Yet it seems fairly clear at this point that the old five-to-ten year estimate is unreliable. The new, reasonable estimate for Iranian nuclear capacity would appear to be two-to-five years. Given that, I think the next election has to focus–and will in fact focus–on the question of what to do about Iran. My guess is that The New Republic’s eagerness to avoid such a debate in an election year helps explain Mr. Levi’s rather dubious essay. The real problem, I’m afraid, is that delaying our national debate until the heart of the 2008 election is already risking too much.

Having seen a dove’s two-year worst case scenario, here’s a five-year estimate on the outer limit for an Iranian bomb by the decidedly hawkish, Barry McCaffrey. I think that confirms the two-to-five year estimate as more prudent and reasonable than the five-to-ten year claim, which seems increasingly dated.

By the way, McCaffrey’s take on our military and national security posture will give you good sense of the trouble we’re in. We are headed for a severely destabilizing nuclear proliferation disaster in the Middle East. And I seriously doubt that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Turkey will take TNR’s relaxed attitude and avoid worst-case scenarios when deciding how soon to protect themselves from Iran by obtaining bombs of their own. Early in his–or her–new term, the next president will face the likelihood of a nuclear Iran, general collapse of the non-proliferation regime, nuclear blackmail in the Gulf, and an extremely dangerous nuclear arms race in the Middle East.