In his Wall Street Journal angry and ad hominem piece against talk radio, Mark Helprin decides to opine on Iraq as well. He writes this:

To begin with, American columns should have cut through Baghdad after three days and exited three weeks later, leaving Saddam dead and a pliant Iraqi strongman to keep the country harmless or suffer the same quick take-down. Rather than being broken on the wheel of irreconcilable Muslim factions, a supple and intact American power would have shattered Arab elation following Sept. 11, and then by threatening their rule been able to discipline the various police states of the region into eliminating their terrorists. Far more efficient that way, without six and more murderous and unavailing years in which neither a single democracy has appeared nor will one. The surge is merely coincident with a change in Sunni strategy. Instead of watching the U.S. and Iran arm the Shiites for a major sectarian war, the Sunni choose to avail themselves of American arms while simultaneously removing the lunatic jihadists nipping at their heels.

There’s a lot to untangle is this paragraph.

For one thing, the idea that the United States should have exited Iraq after three weeks is, I think, deeply flawed. In liberating Iraq, we inherited a divided, traumatized, and collapsing nation. If we had left after less than a month, its descent into chaos and civil war would have been accelerated, not averted. Mass death and genocide would probably have followed. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Iran would have filled the vacuum immediately — and Iraq would be in far worse shape than it is now. The problem with the post-war (Phase IV) planning was that we had too few troops and did not embrace the population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that General Petraeus is now employing, to great effect.

Second, the assertion that there is not a “single democracy” in the Arab world is wrong. Iraq is a democracy. It is a fragile and flawed one, as the United States was for many years after its independence, and the institutions of democracy need to take deeper root. But Iraqis, under threats of death that Mark Helprin thankfully doesn’t face, have held several free and fair elections. We have seen the peaceful transfer of power. Democracy is not perfect, and Helprin may oppose granting the Iraqi people liberty. But whether he likes it or not, Iraq qualifies as a democracy – and it continues to take imperfect steps along that path. It would be nice if Iraqis received support rather than ridicule.

Third, the assertion that the surge is “merely coincident” with a change in Sunni strategy is misleading. The “Anbar Awakening” was an organic Iraqi revolt against AQI – but the surge helped it succeed, and the surge has done much more than simply deal a devastating blow to AQI. The Petraeus strategy has helped the United States win more and more of the confidence of the Iraqi people. The ethno-sectarian violence has plummeted. And Iraq, for all its problems, is on the road to repair.

If Mark Helprin had his way, there is a very good chance it would be a hell on earth.