I generally agree with Ross Douthat’s post on this subject, but I think he overstates his case against backing Ukraine “to the hilt” in one respect and understates it in another. He overstates it because he makes a stronger argument against nation-building and the deployment of ground troops than against arming Russia’s victims. (I’m inclined to agree with NR’s editorial advice about what should be done.) He understates it here:

It’s true that declining to back Ukraine to the hilt will come with a cost: As Judah suggests, in the absence of a Western military intervention the most likely endgame — one perhaps being tacitly accepted by the government in Kiev already — will be some sort of frozen-war, South Ossetian scenario that leaves Russia with de facto control of Ukraine’s eastern marches. And from the perspective of global stability this is hardly ideal. . .

Not ideal, sure, but it’s not as though the lesson will be that aggression pays. If that is indeed the endgame, then Putin’s aggressiveness toward Ukraine will have ended up costing him influence in the country: He had a client government, overreached, and lost most of the country while strengthening an international coalition against him.