That’s overstating it. But in a forthcoming conference paper he certainly seeks to clarify the public conversation about his book. From section one, titled “What r > g Can and Cannot Explain”:

That said, the way in which I perceive the relationship between r > g and inequality is often not well captured in the discussion that has surrounded my book. For example, I do not view r > g as the only or even the primary tool for considering changes in income and wealth in the twentieth century, or for forecasting the path of inequality in the twenty-first century. Institutional changes and political shocks — which to a large extent can be viewed as endogenous to the inequality and development process itself — played a major role in the past, and it will probably be the same in the future.
In addition, I certainly do not believe that r > g is a useful tool for the discussion of rising inequality of labor income: other mechanisms and policies are much more relevant here, e.g., supply and demand of skills and education. For instance, I point out in my book (Piketty 2014a, ch. 8–9) that the rise of top income shares in the United States over the 1980–2010 period is due for the most part to rising inequality of labor earnings, which can itself be explained by a mixture of two groups of factors: rising inequality in access to skills and to higher education over this time period in the United States, an evolution which might have been exacerbated by rising tuition fees and insufficient public investment; and exploding top managerial compensation, itself probably stimulated by changing incentives and norms, and by large cuts in top tax rates (see also Piketty 2014a, ch. 14; Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2014). In any case, this rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r – g, and it is clearly a very important historical development. Indeed it explains why total income inequality is now substantially higher in the United States than in Europe, while the opposite was true until World War I (see Figure 1). At that time, high inequality was mostly due to extreme concentration of capital ownership and capital income. Wealth inequality is currently much less extreme than a century ago, in spite of the fact that the total capitalization of private wealth relative to national income has now recovered from the 1914–1945 shocks (see Figures 2 and 3). One central question for the future is to better understand the conditions under which the concentration of property might return to pre-1914 levels.

(Bold mine.)

Read the whole paper here.