Rich, I should have been clearer on this point. I did not mean to suggest that the attack in Kamdesh is useful for assessing the value of COIN strategy. I referred to it strictly for purposes of discussing force protection (and, relatedly, the rules of engagement). I think force-protection is a consideration separate from COIN or any other overall military strategy, though it’s obviously related to the overall strategy. We had force-protection issues long before there was a COIN strategy in place, and we’d have them regardless of our approach.

I referred to Gen. McChrystal’s statements about how our troops might ironically be more safe with less armor because those statements arise at a time of great concern about force-protection (after this latest attack in Kamdesh, the recent incident in Ganjgal, and the Wanat attack last year). But I don’t think what happened in Kamdesh had much of anything to do with the McChrystal strategy — except for the possibility, reported by that Washington Post story I cited, that the pull-out of the ambushed troops had been delayed, in part, because the McChrystal strategy was being developed. I don’t know if that’s true and it would be irresponsible to speculate — we should get the facts.

My reason for getting into this issue at all is the commentary, including my email. As it has been portrayed in reporting, the force protection has been inadequate. That doesn’t mean our commanders are willfully endangering our forces — it could mean they have made miscalculations, have gotten poor intelligence, and/or have placed too high a priority on avoiding civilian casualties. Terrible mistakes may have been made, but mistakes are not infidelities. People who, unlike me, know Gen. McChrystal or have served under him see him as an exemplary leader and regard as lunacy the suggestion that he would not make protecting our troops a first-order priority. On the other hand, assuming the good faith of the general and other commanders does not mean one has to agree that the troops have, in fact, been adequately protected. Yet, any questioning of this is regarded by the other side of the debate as “despicable” and an attack on our commanders’ honor.

I don’t think it’s helpful to accuse our commanders of recklessness (and worse), and I certainly don’t want to be understood as accusing Gen. McChrystal or anyone else of willfully endangering troops. But I also think it’s unhelpful and insulting to attack people for daring to question the sufficiency of our force-protection measures. This is a critical issue, not a gotcha game. We need to know what happened and why; if people made serious missteps that put our troops at intolerable risk, that needs to be addressed; and we need to be confident going forward that — whatever the mission is and whatever our troop-levels are — those troops are properly safeguarded and operating under rules that allow them to do their inherently dangerous jobs.