A very illuminating, indeed must-read, email from Mark J. Conversino:

Jonah-
I was a squadron commander at the time of Desert Fox in 1998 (we called it
“Deny Christmas ‘98″) and while there was a sense that Clinton’s order to
attack Iraq at that point had a tinge of “wag the dog” to it, we also knew
that this was a long time in coming. (In addition to the Feb 98 comments
you cite, Clinton also warned that Saddam could pass his WMD to “shadowy”
terrorists who traveled unseen among us–sound familiar?). As things
deteriorated throughout the spring, summer and fall of 98, Clinton was under
pressure, from both Dems and Republicans, to carry out a substantial attack
against Iraq. He had been criticized for waging “pin-prick” strikes that
accomplished little of substance. You might recall Bill Cohen hitting the
Sunday chat shows that fall with his 5lb bag of sugar and claims that a
similar amount of Saddamite anthrax would devastate DC and its environs.
In fact, on Veteran’s Day, November 1998, we were spun up for an attack on
Iraq that was called off only after Saddam backed down. B-52s were actually
en route from Diego Garcia when Clinton called off the raid. Thus, when
Richard Butler pulled UNSCOM out of Iraq in December, Clinton was under
intense pressure to “do something”–not because of Monica, but because of
the apparent collapse of inspections and the threat of Saddam’s WMD. So, we
deployed for Desert Fox–4 days of ineffectual bombing.
I’ve attached a link to a piece I recently published on Desert Fox (print
versions in US and UK are forthcoming in Jan 06).
It considers the operation from the perspective of the proper use of
airpower, which may be of little interest to you. Still, here is what I
think is important to the current discussion that many, including and
especially Democrats, forget: Desert Fox was carried out by the US and UK
only; the French dropped out of Southern Watch operations as a result of the
brief campaign and called for the lifting of sanctions. Moscow recalled its
ambassadors from London and Washington in protest and the Chinese dubbed the raids an act of international terrorism. Most Arab states refused us the
use of their soil for combat sorties (Turkey, as well, opted out). Again,
does this sound familiar? Clinton made thinly veiled references to regime
change as well, generating speculation in the media that taking Saddam out
was our real goal (though an unrealistic one, as I argue that a 4-day air
campaign, limited to 100 targets, would hardly unseat a ruthless tyrant like
Saddam). Yet, let’s not forget the Oct 98 Iraq Liberation Act, either, that
established regime change as US policy long before GWB became president.
It’s clear to me that the Clinton Administration certainly “hoped” Desert
Fox would bring about a collapse of Saddam’s regime–but hope is not a plan.
But long before OIF, the “international community” regarded Saddam and his
weapons as an Anglo-American problem and cared little about Baghdad’s lack
of compliance with UN resolutions and inspections. President Bush’s
opponents want us to think that the choice was between a neat, tidy and
“safe” status quo with a WMD-less Iraq, or regime change and a bloody
insurgency. The situation that emerged from Desert Fox, in my view, puts
the lie to that. In fact, Desert Fox was the last major military
confrontation between the US and Iraq prior to OIF, and its consequences set
the stage for our diplomatic struggles in the run-up to OIF.
Our knowledge of Saddam’s WMD stockpiles and programs remained frozen in
time from 1998 until 2003, since Desert Fox failed to induce Iraq to
cooperate with UNSCOM. Indeed, Saddam declared victory–and rightly so, in
my view. The sanctions, such as they were, remained, but the inspectors
were gone and the tyrant remained securely in power. And for those Dems who
claim that Clinton “got it all” (Saddam’s WMD, not Monica) during Desert
Fox, they should know that we purposely avoided targeting what we thought
were “known” stockpiles. We feared the release of chemical agents and bio
toxins that would cause massive collateral damage. Of the 100 targets, 11
were directly WMD-related, and they were nearly all tied to his missile
delivery systems.
In summary, there was a real sense of urgency that Saddam was slipping the
noose and something had to be done. Those who wish to understand our view
of the threat posed by Iraq pre-OIF, need to become familiar with this often
overlooked operation.
As always, thanks for your time.