Meanwhile, elsewhere on the Journal editorial page, Bret Stephens has an excellent column. He summarizes Olmert’s difficulties thusly: Yet the incrementalist approach has its downside, too: You’ve [Olmert] squandered momentum, lost the element of surprise and given Hezbollah time to prepare a nasty reception. Too bad you didn’t order the troops in at the beginning, to take control of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. Then you could have worked your way backward, eliminated the Katyusha and mortar threat, prevented the exodus of civilians from northern Israel, killed Hezbollah’s guerrillas and pulverized the infrastructure they’ve spent the past six years preparing.You also have to worry that the diplomatic winds won’t long blow fair. What happens when an IDF bomb goes astray over Beirut and kills scores of civilians within plain view of the media?… Your quandary, therefore, is this: As a matter of perception, the war is yours to lose. As a matter of reality, you might very easily lose it. This gap between perception and reality makes victory all the more difficult to achieve. And proposes this very feasible-sounding solution: You will moderate air strikes against civilian infrastructure, but will continue to strike Hezbollah leadership and long-range missile facilities. It may be difficult to kill Sheikh Nasrallah, but it’s within Israel’s power to prevent him from ever appearing in public again. At the same time, you will send ground forces to the Litani to destroy every Hezbollah bunker, outpost, communications facility and weapons cache. You will withdraw the bulk of those forces as soon as feasible, but you will announce that Israel will shoot on sight any Hezbollah forces that move within 10 miles of the border. That should get the Katyushas out of range of Haifa and Tiberias. As for the much deadlier Fajar and Zilzal missiles, you will publicly hold Damascus accountable for their use, since these Iranian missiles could not have reached Lebanon without Syrian connivance. This should have a clarifying effect on Bashar Assad, who will risk war with Israel only through his proxies and who, if pressed, may bring pressure to bear on Sheikh Nasrallah. Finally, you will play the diplomatic game with apparent sincerity, entertaining every proposal provided two baseline conditions are met: Your kidnapped soldiers are returned, without preconditions, and Hezbollah is disarmed, as Security Council 1559 Resolution demands. Neither is likely to happen, but in the meantime you will dominate southern Lebanon, secure Israel’s border and humiliate Hezbollah.