An e-mail (I think we’re tapping into a long-running argument here):

I would expect nothing less from Fred (to whom I have written letters on this several times with no response), with his true devotion to Clausewitzian “trinitarian” warfare. However, the book on counterinsurgency is long and the recipe for success is very well known. It’s just that, except for the USMC, the services only give it lip service. Max Boot would dispute the point with him. As to the most successful operations involving both light and heavy forces, what he really means is we took Falujah using a lot of dismounted grunts supported by a handful of tanks. You could pull almost all of the Abrams and Bradley battalions out of Iraq and we wouldn’t lose much. Regarding end strength, Kagan is still pushing for top line increases in manpower, which I think is a waste of time (you’ll only dilute quality). What really must be done is a total reorganization that demobilizes most of the heavy divisions (leave one for Korea, one for the Middle East, and one in CONUS), and retrain and reorganize the troops freed up as 11-Bravos. Organizaing 2500-3000 man light infantry brigades with some 2000 riflemen each is a much better use of manpower. On a related note, if Kagan were really serious, he’d call for a total revamp of the reserve component, moving most of the Combat Service Support back into the active forces, and then reorganizing the Army Reserve and National Guard as combat arms to round out the active force for surge. But that’s another story.