The ability of drones to give added bite to the underdog will force a redefinition of asymmetrical war.
As a reminder, the term “gray zone” describes an action or series of actions that are not quite war, and not quite not war, either.
Writing about this phenomenon in July two years ago, I borrowed a definition from Clementine G. Starling, the deputy director of the Forward Defense program and a resident fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative (a definition I have since used on a number of occasions):
The gray zone describes a set of activities that occur between peace (or cooperation) and war (or armed conflict). A multitude of activities fall into this murky in-between — from nefarious economic activities, influence operations, and cyberattacks to mercenary operations, assassinations, and disinformation campaigns. Generally, gray-zone activities are considered gradualist campaigns by state and non-state actors that combine non-military and quasi-military tools and fall below the threshold of armed conflict. They aim to thwart, destabilize, weaken, or attack an adversary, and they are often tailored toward the vulnerabilities of the target state. While gray-zone activities are nothing new, the onset of new technologies has provided states with more tools to operate and avoid clear categorization, attribution, and detection — all of which complicates the United States’ and its allies’ ability to respond.
As Jim Geraghty reported earlier this summer from NATO’s northeastern border, there is no doubt that the pace and intensity of operations within this zone is increasing, something subsequently confirmed by the dispatch of an explosive-laden drone (it contained twice as much Semtex as the device that blew up Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie) to Leipzig Airport. Mercifully it was headed off by a vigilant bus driver:
Aug 7 (Reuters) — A bus driver knocked an explosive-laden drone out of the air, potentially preventing an attack this week at a German airport that serves as a major NATO and cargo logistics hub, a senior lawmaker said on Friday.
Now there is this (via Energy News):
A Romanian F-16 fighter jet destroyed a sea drone carrying explosives on Thursday after it came within a few hundred metres of one of the platforms at the Neptun Deep gas field. . . .
On 11 August, Romania also destroyed two Russian-made Gerbera-type drones [suicide drones] drifting in the water near the Neptun Deep gas field.
Located at the eastern edge of Romania’s exclusive economic zone, Neptun Deep is Romania’s most significant offshore gas field. It is estimated to contain around 100 billion cubic metres of gas.
Three suspects have been detained in connection with the arson attack on the building of the defense industry company Milrem Robotics, the Prosecutor’s Office has said. Initial information suggests the act was premeditated.
A fire was reported at a building used by Milrem Robotics in Tallinn’s Lasnamäe district on Betooni tänav in Tallinn overnight into Saturday. The company specializes in robotic and autonomous systems for military and security applications, and its machines are used in Ukraine. . . .
In 2022, Russia announced a reward for the capture and delivery of a Milrem Robotics-built THeMIS unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) deployed in Ukraine.
And this, via the Daily Telegraph:
Russia has installed secret bases capable of firing high-powered drones deep into Nato territory.
A Telegraph investigation can reveal 10 Kremlin bases with newly built launch pads for Moscow’s most advanced long-range suicide drones.
Some of the bases are already being used to pummel Ukraine, with their proximity to the border helping with mass aerial attacks launched past Kyiv’s diminishing air defences.
According to this report, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, Europe is boosting its defenses against drones, but there is a very, very long way to go.
And the U.S. is not going to be immune. Dealing with that unpleasant reality will include toughening potential targets, both within this country and beyond it, including American forward defense installations based in or close to parts of the world where there is or could be trouble.
Iran has also fired thousands of missiles and drones at land targets in the region, hitting U.S. bases and tragically killing seven U.S. service personnel while injuring over 400. Iran has successfully struck over 200 targets in Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. It achieved most of these hits with projectiles, whose accuracy, resilience, and numbers U.S. political leaders clearly underrated prior to the war.
NSA Bahrain was built long before Iran possessed the arsenal of precision missiles and drones it has today, and the war revealed its vulnerabilities.
“We’ve been there for more than 50 years, and the base grew up the way the base grew up,” said retired Vice Adm. John “Fozzie” Miller, who commanded U.S. naval forces in the Middle East. “I think there are some things we would do differently.”
The new vulnerability of such bases could also, unless they are properly defended against attack by drone or missile, undermine the ability of the U.S. to resupply its forces in the region.
To take one example, (via MS (August 21)):
Nearly 5,000 sailors and Marines aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln went without basic supplies — including toothpaste, deodorant and soap — at points during the ship’s grueling nine-month deployment. The shortages have been the subject of weeks of reporting and family accounts.
Less widely understood is why the shortages happened: The war with Iran left a Navy base in Bahrain damaged and the Strait of Hormuz too dangerous to use, forcing the Navy to resupply the ship from an island in the Indian Ocean more than 2,200 miles away, according to current and former Navy leaders
“The net result is that replenishment ships now have to travel more than three times as far to pick up supplies from ashore,” Thane Clare, a retired Navy captain, told MS NOW. “In practical terms, a transit from Bahrain to the Gulf of Oman at 16 knots takes about one-and-a-half days. The trip from Diego Garcia, on the other hand, takes about five days. Accounting for round trips to pick up more supplies, a replenishment ship that could have resupplied Lincoln once every three days can now replenish Lincoln only once every 10 days.”
The ability of drones to give added bite to the “underdog” will, at least until an effective (and cost-effective) way is developed to deal with them, force a redefinition of asymmetrical war, even more so when it is being fought a long way from home, especially when those underdogs, as in Iran’s case, have also been well-equipped with missiles.
And this is true on the home front, too. The 2025 Ukrainian operation Spider’s Web should be a wake-up call to those running military installations in this country (and maybe it has been).
A 2025 report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies gives a good description of what is known about Spider’s Web.
In brief:
Using small striking drones covertly smuggled into Russia and launched from hidden compartments inside cargo trucks, the operation struck more than 40 high-value aircraft—including strategic bombers Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and A-50 planes used for launching and coordinating missile attacks on Ukrainian cities.
The operation involved attacking aircraft at four bases ranging from one in Russia’s far north to one in Siberia. Among its features were the ways in which those running it made use of (unwitting) Russian help, the drivers who drove the trucks (containing the disguised drones and their launchers). The drivers left the trucks parked at laybys and gas stations near the airfields where the target aircraft were located. The (lack of) distance mattered, as it meant that, once launched, “the drones could bypass Russia’s layered air defense systems—including Pantsir and S-300 units—before they could react.”
And so at the designated time the roofs of the cabins were remotely opened, and the drones were launched from within the trucks. The drones, which probably cost $1,000 or less, were remotely controlled by “pilots” operating (it seems) from Ukraine through Russian mobile telecommunications networks. It’s thought that some of the targeting may have been AI-assisted, to help, for example, in identifying weak points on the planes.
Technically and strategically, Spider’s Web was a brilliant Ukrainian coup, but its implications are terrifying and are a powerful reminder, especially in an age of terrorism, gray zone conflict, and mounting geopolitical tension, that toughening our defenses at home will have to be (another) priority.
CISS:
From critical military infrastructure to civilian sites, the vulnerability to small, precise, and hard-to-detect systems is growing. Conventional air defenses are often ill-suited for this new threat landscape, prompting an urgent call for innovation in early detection, electronic warfare, and layered physical defenses.
Meanwhile, via the New York Post:
The NYPD is prepared to take down any unauthorized drones flying over the upcoming US Open in New York City — marking the first event nationwide where local law enforcement has that independent authority, Commissioner Jessica Tisch announced Friday.
“I am pleased to announce today that the NYPD now has new independent legal authority to conduct drone mitigation operations at major events when necessary to address unauthorized drone activity,” the top cop said.
This new power was the result of the federal Safer Skies Act, which was passed by Congress in December and went into effect in July, the top cop said.
Good.