The Kohler Investigation, II

The one way to make sense of the Kohler “investigation,” we noted in an earlier installment, is to view it as a political contest between Republicans who want to publicize UAW strike tactics and Democrats who don’t. As the hearings moved into their fifth week, with the long-awaited confrontation of Walter Reuther near at hand, the defeat of the Republicans was as good as accomplished. The Republicans had succeeded in putting together a telling indictment of the UAW leadership, but the Democrats—thanks to adroit maneuvering on the part of the committee members and the UAW counsel, and to the cooperation of the daily press—had succeeded in burying the indictment in the official transcripts. The press had not ignored the investigation. Headlines told of Chairman McClellan’s charge of “smear” at Kohler’s hiring of a UP photographer to take pictures of UAW counsel Rauh talking with committee members; of Kohler counsel Conger’s testimony that the company had hired private detectives (“spies”) to track down evidence of law violation; of McClellan’s gallantry in preventing Republicans from impeaching the UAW’s chief international representative at Sheboygan by showing that the woman he had publicly represented to the community as his wife, in fact had been his mistress. But such items had squeezed out nearly all reference to the question to which the bulk of the testimony related: how the UAW conducted the strike.

The day McClellan huffed about the UP photographer, the committee’s chief witness was John Konec, the UAW’s “picket captain” during the strike. Had UAW picketers, Senator Mundt wanted to know, kept non-strikers out of the plant? Yes, Konec conceded— but this was not the union’s “intent.” Had the picketers (two to three thousand of them) marched shoulder to shoulder in two lines moving in opposite directions in front of the Kohler gates? Yes—but this had been done in order to make room for all of those who wanted to take part in the demonstration. Had the union made a point of taking down the name and license plate numbers of workers who tried to cross the picket lines or who applied for employment at Kohler after the strike had begun? Yes—but the purpose had been to enable the UAW to “contact” the wayward, “talk to them,” and “persuade” them of their error. Had Konec been aware of a series of “home demonstrations” by a couple of hundred persons in front of the houses of non-strikers? Yes— but Konec was sure they had been “completely spontaneous.” Had Konec been present at such demonstrations? Yes, at two of them (later it was six)—but this had been “entirely by accident”: he happened to own a tavern nearby, and on hearing the ruckus, naturally wandered over to see what was going on.

LB

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L. Brent Bozell Jr.

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The one way to make sense of the Kohler “investigation,” we noted in an earlier installment, is to view it as a political contest between Republicans who want to publicize UAW strike tactics and Democrats who don’t. As the hearings moved into their fifth week, with the long-awaited confrontation of Walter Reuther near at hand, the defeat of the Republicans was as good as accomplished. The Republicans had succeeded in putting together a telling indictment of the UAW leadership, but the Democrats—thanks to adroit maneuvering on the part of the committee members and the UAW counsel, and to the cooperation of the daily press—had succeeded in burying the indictment in the official transcripts. The press had not ignored the investigation. Headlines told of Chairman McClellan’s charge of “smear” at Kohler’s hiring of a UP photographer to take pictures of UAW counsel Rauh talking with committee members; of Kohler counsel Conger’s testimony that the company had hired private detectives (“spies”) to track down evidence of law violation; of McClellan’s gallantry in preventing Republicans from impeaching the UAW’s chief international representative at Sheboygan by showing that the woman he had publicly represented to the community as his wife, in fact had been his mistress. But such items had squeezed out nearly all reference to the question to which the bulk of the testimony related: how the UAW conducted the strike.

The day McClellan huffed about the UP photographer, the committee’s chief witness was John Konec, the UAW’s “picket captain” during the strike. Had UAW picketers, Senator Mundt wanted to know, kept non-strikers out of the plant? Yes, Konec conceded— but this was not the union’s “intent.” Had the picketers (two to three thousand of them) marched shoulder to shoulder in two lines moving in opposite directions in front of the Kohler gates? Yes—but this had been done in order to make room for all of those who wanted to take part in the demonstration. Had the union made a point of taking down the name and license plate numbers of workers who tried to cross the picket lines or who applied for employment at Kohler after the strike had begun? Yes—but the purpose had been to enable the UAW to “contact” the wayward, “talk to them,” and “persuade” them of their error. Had Konec been aware of a series of “home demonstrations” by a couple of hundred persons in front of the houses of non-strikers? Yes— but Konec was sure they had been “completely spontaneous.” Had Konec been present at such demonstrations? Yes, at two of them (later it was six)—but this had been “entirely by accident”: he happened to own a tavern nearby, and on hearing the ruckus, naturally wandered over to see what was going on.