The Curse of Euro-Nationalism

still lacked crucial information, which nearly led to catastrophic errors. It did not know, for instance, that the local Russian commander in Cuba apparently had been predelegated to launch his missiles if attacked. So the option pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—an air strike and invasion—probably would have unwittingly prompted a nuclear exchange. As Bob McNamara always says, “We lucked out.” Here, then, is the ultimate backup to the sort of deterrence pushed by critics of missile defense: luck.

There is no reason to believe that luck will always hold, especially against culturally alien adversaries whom the U.S. doesn’t understand as well as it did the Soviets. The U.S. knows, for instance, little or nothing about North Korea. In the recent EP-3 crisis, it didn’t even know who was making decisions in China. And deterrence failed against Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait, partly because we didn’t know how to deliver a message to him. Diplomat April Glaspie’s overly subtle warning was taken as a modified go- ahead. “We foolishly did not realize he was stupid,” said Glaspie afterwards. Well, get used to it—the world is full of folly and miscalculation.

About the Author

John O’Sullivan

John O’Sullivan is a senior fellow at National Review Institute and a contributing editor of National Review.

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still lacked crucial information, which nearly led to catastrophic errors. It did not know, for instance, that the local Russian commander in Cuba apparently had been predelegated to launch his missiles if attacked. So the option pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—an air strike and invasion—probably would have unwittingly prompted a nuclear exchange. As Bob McNamara always says, “We lucked out.” Here, then, is the ultimate backup to the sort of deterrence pushed by critics of missile defense: luck.

There is no reason to believe that luck will always hold, especially against culturally alien adversaries whom the U.S. doesn’t understand as well as it did the Soviets. The U.S. knows, for instance, little or nothing about North Korea. In the recent EP-3 crisis, it didn’t even know who was making decisions in China. And deterrence failed against Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait, partly because we didn’t know how to deliver a message to him. Diplomat April Glaspie’s overly subtle warning was taken as a modified go- ahead. “We foolishly did not realize he was stupid,” said Glaspie afterwards. Well, get used to it—the world is full of folly and miscalculation.