Bismarck is supposed to have said that asking him to take political principles into account when conducting foreign policy was like suggesting that he walk through a dense forest with a twelve-foot pole between his teeth. Well, he would say that, wouldn’t he? Still, even if we discount for the cynicism of a 19th- century practitioner of realpolitik, his observation cannot be dismissed. For when U.S. policy-makers turn to such places as Afghanistan and the Balkans, they bring with them a set of principles that often make them stumble.
Here are three such rules: You should not change borders; you should not pro- pose a peaceful transfer of populations; and your solution—especially if it re- quires force—must have the approval of the U.N. Now, these are all useful ideas, provided that they are seen as caution- ary—and optional—restraints. Changing borders is reasonably seen as dangerous because it might be a precedent encouraging expansionist states to seek the forcible breakup of vulnerable nations. Peaceful transfers of populations are dis- liked lest they encourage violent “ethnic cleansing.” And U.N. sanction is required because diplomats generally want to place as many obstacles as possible in the way of force as a solution to disputes.





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