The Bell Curve: Is Intelligence Fixed?

THAT people differ in intelligence, that the more intelligent will do better at many things, that IQ tests (and a good number of other similar tests) will give us a pretty good picture of how people differ in intelligence—there is not much to object to in all of this. Elaboration on these matters of common judgment makes up half or more of The Bell Curve. Even this much has been found objectionable in the past, and will be found objectionable today, and by people of, one assumes, high intelligence. Thus one federal judge in California has asserted, as a matter of law, that intelligence tests cannot be used to place duller children in classes designed to help them, and intelligence tests have been subjected to massive, booklength assault by distinguished scientists because some of those who devised and used them believed there were inherited differences in intelligence among races.

On these matters Herrnstein and Murray are to me completely convincing. On more controversial matters, such as the notion that there are substantial differences in intelligence among different groups defined by a common inheritance and culture, they are also convincing to me. We take these differences in intelligence for granted in the case of families, and it stands to reason that such differences might also characterize larger groups that share some common features in genetic inheritance and culture. Otherwise we would have no explanation for the disproportionate presence of Jews and Asians in selective high schools and selective colleges, or the disproportionate presence of these groups in such occupations as medicine, law, and college teaching.

NG

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Nathan Glazer

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THAT people differ in intelligence, that the more intelligent will do better at many things, that IQ tests (and a good number of other similar tests) will give us a pretty good picture of how people differ in intelligence—there is not much to object to in all of this. Elaboration on these matters of common judgment makes up half or more of The Bell Curve. Even this much has been found objectionable in the past, and will be found objectionable today, and by people of, one assumes, high intelligence. Thus one federal judge in California has asserted, as a matter of law, that intelligence tests cannot be used to place duller children in classes designed to help them, and intelligence tests have been subjected to massive, booklength assault by distinguished scientists because some of those who devised and used them believed there were inherited differences in intelligence among races.

On these matters Herrnstein and Murray are to me completely convincing. On more controversial matters, such as the notion that there are substantial differences in intelligence among different groups defined by a common inheritance and culture, they are also convincing to me. We take these differences in intelligence for granted in the case of families, and it stands to reason that such differences might also characterize larger groups that share some common features in genetic inheritance and culture. Otherwise we would have no explanation for the disproportionate presence of Jews and Asians in selective high schools and selective colleges, or the disproportionate presence of these groups in such occupations as medicine, law, and college teaching.