On the Right

New York, Jan. 29—The accelerating impatience with such as Helmut Schmidt, who celebrated the imposition of martial law in Poland by visiting East Germany and cooing with the folks on the other side of the great wall, is especially vexing because on the one hand we are entitled to be indignant; but on the other hand, our indignation perfectly suits the strategic designs of the Soviet Union. Mr. Reagan is justifiably under fire for not acting more decisively in the matter of Poland. Henry Kissinger correctly indicts our failure to close off financial credit for the Soviet Union, and our inexplicable determination to continue to negotiate with the leaders of the Soviet Union precisely at a moment when it has been proved that negotiations with the Soviet Union don’t accomplish anything. We are at fault for indecisive leadership. But we cannot signify to Europe that we have arrived at terminal impatience. Not without giving to the Soviets that which they most desire, namely the dissolution of the NATO alliance.

Ah, but they say it is for all intents and purposes already a shambles. That is only half true. The day to watch for is the day in 1983 when the Alliance is scheduled to begin the deployment of our theater nuclear weapons. We are, for reasons that elude some of us, at present negotiating whether to go forward with a commitment to deploy. Mr. Reagan said in November that this was a zero-option negotiation. By that he meant that either the Soviet Union would withdraw its SS-20 missiles, in which case we would hold back on our Pershing and Tomahawk missiles or else we would proceed to deploy. The question arises, If Mr. Reagan is resolute in his intentions, why is it necessary to negotiate in the matter? The next question that arises is: Assuming that the Soviet Union were to withdraw its theater missiles, where would they then be located? With a range of 4,500 miles, they could retreat to an area east of Moscow and still serve their deadly purpose as instruments of intimidation against European cities.

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William F. Buckley Jr.

William F. Buckley Jr. founded National Review magazine in 1955.

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William F. Buckley Jr.

New York, Jan. 29—The accelerating impatience with such as Helmut Schmidt, who celebrated the imposition of martial law in Poland by visiting East Germany and cooing with the folks on the other side of the great wall, is especially vexing because on the one hand we are entitled to be indignant; but on the other hand, our indignation perfectly suits the strategic designs of the Soviet Union. Mr. Reagan is justifiably under fire for not acting more decisively in the matter of Poland. Henry Kissinger correctly indicts our failure to close off financial credit for the Soviet Union, and our inexplicable determination to continue to negotiate with the leaders of the Soviet Union precisely at a moment when it has been proved that negotiations with the Soviet Union don’t accomplish anything. We are at fault for indecisive leadership. But we cannot signify to Europe that we have arrived at terminal impatience. Not without giving to the Soviets that which they most desire, namely the dissolution of the NATO alliance.

Ah, but they say it is for all intents and purposes already a shambles. That is only half true. The day to watch for is the day in 1983 when the Alliance is scheduled to begin the deployment of our theater nuclear weapons. We are, for reasons that elude some of us, at present negotiating whether to go forward with a commitment to deploy. Mr. Reagan said in November that this was a zero-option negotiation. By that he meant that either the Soviet Union would withdraw its SS-20 missiles, in which case we would hold back on our Pershing and Tomahawk missiles or else we would proceed to deploy. The question arises, If Mr. Reagan is resolute in his intentions, why is it necessary to negotiate in the matter? The next question that arises is: Assuming that the Soviet Union were to withdraw its theater missiles, where would they then be located? With a range of 4,500 miles, they could retreat to an area east of Moscow and still serve their deadly purpose as instruments of intimidation against European cities.