Collapsing Saddam

WHEN President Bush made clear that the next campaigns in the war on terror would focus on states developing weapons of mass destruction, the skeptical refrain instantly emerged: “Don’t expect Iraq to be a pushover like Afghanistan.” (Just a few months ago, of course, the skeptical refrain was, “Don’t expect Afghanistan to be a pushover like Iraq.”) And it’s true that the campaign against Iraq will not be Desert Storm II. It will, instead, reflect the “transformational” strategic approach defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined in his recent speech at the National Defense University—using and integrating all the elements of national power towards the goal of ending the terror regime of Saddam Hussein. The key is not to focus on a single type of effort, but to apply pressure in a variety of ways until the regime collapses.

As with the Afghanistan war, our first moves should be diplomatic. An important factor in the swift victory over the Taliban was the isolation of the Afghan dictatorship. Iraq has long been an international pariah, but has lately been taking steps to improve its international standing, especially in the Arab world. The United States should not take forceful measures to prevent Iraq from polishing its image or claiming the mantle of victimhood. The U.S. should instead seek to keep the anti-terror alliance together, and conduct a serious publicinformation campaign against Iraq. Nor should the U.S. be deterred by an initial lack of allied enthusiasm; it is worth remembering that George H. W. Bush did not have even the entire U.S. Congress behind him at the beginning of Desert Storm.

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James S. Robbins

James S. Robbins is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council.

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WHEN President Bush made clear that the next campaigns in the war on terror would focus on states developing weapons of mass destruction, the skeptical refrain instantly emerged: “Don’t expect Iraq to be a pushover like Afghanistan.” (Just a few months ago, of course, the skeptical refrain was, “Don’t expect Afghanistan to be a pushover like Iraq.”) And it’s true that the campaign against Iraq will not be Desert Storm II. It will, instead, reflect the “transformational” strategic approach defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined in his recent speech at the National Defense University—using and integrating all the elements of national power towards the goal of ending the terror regime of Saddam Hussein. The key is not to focus on a single type of effort, but to apply pressure in a variety of ways until the regime collapses.

As with the Afghanistan war, our first moves should be diplomatic. An important factor in the swift victory over the Taliban was the isolation of the Afghan dictatorship. Iraq has long been an international pariah, but has lately been taking steps to improve its international standing, especially in the Arab world. The United States should not take forceful measures to prevent Iraq from polishing its image or claiming the mantle of victimhood. The U.S. should instead seek to keep the anti-terror alliance together, and conduct a serious publicinformation campaign against Iraq. Nor should the U.S. be deterred by an initial lack of allied enthusiasm; it is worth remembering that George H. W. Bush did not have even the entire U.S. Congress behind him at the beginning of Desert Storm.