The Facts

The facts concerning U.S. neutrality are as follows. Not until it became evident that there were definite political overtones to the seizure of the Dominican Army Chief of Staff on the 24th of April, and the apparent revolt by two Army camps, did our embassy in Santo Domingo begin to consider intervention. The situation was still not clear enough by Sunday morning, April 25, when President Reid Cabral requested intervention, to convince the Embassy that drastic measures were called for. Even though “Donny” Reid was admittedly the most effective Dominican chief of state in recent times, the U.S. felt that a simple military coup against Reid would not seriously affect our interests.

But as the events of April 25 further unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that something more than a routine military coup was in progress. Originally, it had been estimated that the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), although associated with some of the coup leaders, was not in a position to exert a major influence over the course of events. However, when the Embassy learned of a crucial meeting by coup leaders at the National Palace, late Sunday morning, this estimate had to be rapidly revised. It was reported that as the victorious military leaders were sitting down to divide the spoils, 70 PRD leaders, along with some known Communists, thrust their way into the Palace and announced that they were present to participate in and control any government the military were intent on forming. The PRD leaders had important known allies among the military men, and at this point others suddenly surfaced as strong PRD supporters. The rest of the coup leaders now realized that their desire to oust Reid for purely selfish reasons had been cleverly exploited by the well-organized PRD civilian and military supporters. This meeting broke up in an uproar, and the civil war was on.

JB

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J.B. Bender

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The facts concerning U.S. neutrality are as follows. Not until it became evident that there were definite political overtones to the seizure of the Dominican Army Chief of Staff on the 24th of April, and the apparent revolt by two Army camps, did our embassy in Santo Domingo begin to consider intervention. The situation was still not clear enough by Sunday morning, April 25, when President Reid Cabral requested intervention, to convince the Embassy that drastic measures were called for. Even though “Donny” Reid was admittedly the most effective Dominican chief of state in recent times, the U.S. felt that a simple military coup against Reid would not seriously affect our interests.

But as the events of April 25 further unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that something more than a routine military coup was in progress. Originally, it had been estimated that the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), although associated with some of the coup leaders, was not in a position to exert a major influence over the course of events. However, when the Embassy learned of a crucial meeting by coup leaders at the National Palace, late Sunday morning, this estimate had to be rapidly revised. It was reported that as the victorious military leaders were sitting down to divide the spoils, 70 PRD leaders, along with some known Communists, thrust their way into the Palace and announced that they were present to participate in and control any government the military were intent on forming. The PRD leaders had important known allies among the military men, and at this point others suddenly surfaced as strong PRD supporters. The rest of the coup leaders now realized that their desire to oust Reid for purely selfish reasons had been cleverly exploited by the well-organized PRD civilian and military supporters. This meeting broke up in an uproar, and the civil war was on.