The Dimensions of European Power

national review’s “great debate” is a “great debate” with a difference, for the two positions are not dictated by mutually irreconcilable objectives. Though sharply opposed, they are rooted in common ground. Both Burnham and Schlamm write out of a will to victory over Communism. Both know that the victory, if ever won, will be won with power; neither, that is to say, thinks that the moral superiority of our cause makes us immune to destruction, or that the inquity of the Soviet system will one day automatically deliver the Red Army into our hands. And both are thinking in terms of victory without total war—i.e., victory achieved by pressures and partial advances that will finally dishearten the enemy and make him ours. Each recognizes the sheer impossibility of our willing an atomic war; both, therefore, seek ways and means of destroying the enemy’s will to fight.

Here, however, they begin to disagree. Schlamm would have us impress the Soviets with our superior military might; Burnham asks for a political rollback, based on the determined anti-Communism of the East Europeans. Schlamm would build up German military power within NATO; Burnham would settle for a NATO without Germany provided the Soviet troops withdraw from Eastern Europe. And behind these positions lie conflicting evaluations of at least two factors in the power struggle: 1) Germany’s role in the world scene, and 2) the role of NATO military forces in Central Europe.

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Gerhart Niemeyer

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national review’s “great debate” is a “great debate” with a difference, for the two positions are not dictated by mutually irreconcilable objectives. Though sharply opposed, they are rooted in common ground. Both Burnham and Schlamm write out of a will to victory over Communism. Both know that the victory, if ever won, will be won with power; neither, that is to say, thinks that the moral superiority of our cause makes us immune to destruction, or that the inquity of the Soviet system will one day automatically deliver the Red Army into our hands. And both are thinking in terms of victory without total war—i.e., victory achieved by pressures and partial advances that will finally dishearten the enemy and make him ours. Each recognizes the sheer impossibility of our willing an atomic war; both, therefore, seek ways and means of destroying the enemy’s will to fight.

Here, however, they begin to disagree. Schlamm would have us impress the Soviets with our superior military might; Burnham asks for a political rollback, based on the determined anti-Communism of the East Europeans. Schlamm would build up German military power within NATO; Burnham would settle for a NATO without Germany provided the Soviet troops withdraw from Eastern Europe. And behind these positions lie conflicting evaluations of at least two factors in the power struggle: 1) Germany’s role in the world scene, and 2) the role of NATO military forces in Central Europe.