Election Prospects in India Prakash

If anybody is under the impression that as a result of the happenings in Tibet or of the Communist Chinese aggression and occupation of 14,000 square miles of her nothern border territory, India’s 210 million voters will elect a solidly anti-Communist or pro-Western government in the February 1962 General Elections, he is in for a sad disillusionment. Indeed, the chances are that the present slow drift towards Communism will not only continue, but may even be accelerated.

Admittedly, at present the Chinese aggression is the hottest issue. The invasion of Goa, with the backwash of world disapproval, was a momentary sensation which only enhanced Nehru’s popularity here in India. In the overall spectrum it is less important than the China issue domestically. The Chinese aggression has not damaged the Communist cause seriously because it is seen not as a Communist aggression but purely as a Chinese aggression. Both Mr. Nehru and his Congress Party have chosen to present it that way. And the Indian press has simply toed the line. Mr. Nehru’s stock argument has been that whenever China has had a strong and efficient government in the past, it has shown a tendency to expand. More than once, the Indians have been told that if the Chiang Kai-shek government had been strong and efficient enough, it probably would have done the same thing.

PJ

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Prakash C. Jain

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If anybody is under the impression that as a result of the happenings in Tibet or of the Communist Chinese aggression and occupation of 14,000 square miles of her nothern border territory, India’s 210 million voters will elect a solidly anti-Communist or pro-Western government in the February 1962 General Elections, he is in for a sad disillusionment. Indeed, the chances are that the present slow drift towards Communism will not only continue, but may even be accelerated.

Admittedly, at present the Chinese aggression is the hottest issue. The invasion of Goa, with the backwash of world disapproval, was a momentary sensation which only enhanced Nehru’s popularity here in India. In the overall spectrum it is less important than the China issue domestically. The Chinese aggression has not damaged the Communist cause seriously because it is seen not as a Communist aggression but purely as a Chinese aggression. Both Mr. Nehru and his Congress Party have chosen to present it that way. And the Indian press has simply toed the line. Mr. Nehru’s stock argument has been that whenever China has had a strong and efficient government in the past, it has shown a tendency to expand. More than once, the Indians have been told that if the Chiang Kai-shek government had been strong and efficient enough, it probably would have done the same thing.