Non-Atomic Wars

Mr. Osgood warns that we are at present prepared, both militarily and psychologically, for but two courses: total war or piecemeal surrender. While we must maintain nuclear capacity to prevent losing by default, and on the off chance that somebody’s miscalculation may trigger the catastrophe nobody wants, we must also remember that the Soviets will hardly start throwing H-bombs so that we can retaliate. Those who would rule the world naturally intend to be around to enjoy it. Nor is it likely that we would begin throwing the bombs ourselves, although we might possibly do so in desperation after a series of limited defeats had fatally undermined our position. Therefore, Mr. Osgood proposes that we prepare ourselves for limited contests—those local aggressions and civil wars by which the Communists have been advancing and will continue to advance to their goal.

This is undoubtedly correct, but here the author gets off his own track. He concludes that the way to get the proper force is to spend more money (even $50 billion a year, he says) and draft more men. And once achieved, this limited capacity should be used solely to contain Communism. Thus Mr. Osgood would have us be right for the wrong reasons and by the wrong methods.

JM

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J. P. McFadden

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Mr. Osgood warns that we are at present prepared, both militarily and psychologically, for but two courses: total war or piecemeal surrender. While we must maintain nuclear capacity to prevent losing by default, and on the off chance that somebody’s miscalculation may trigger the catastrophe nobody wants, we must also remember that the Soviets will hardly start throwing H-bombs so that we can retaliate. Those who would rule the world naturally intend to be around to enjoy it. Nor is it likely that we would begin throwing the bombs ourselves, although we might possibly do so in desperation after a series of limited defeats had fatally undermined our position. Therefore, Mr. Osgood proposes that we prepare ourselves for limited contests—those local aggressions and civil wars by which the Communists have been advancing and will continue to advance to their goal.

This is undoubtedly correct, but here the author gets off his own track. He concludes that the way to get the proper force is to spend more money (even $50 billion a year, he says) and draft more men. And once achieved, this limited capacity should be used solely to contain Communism. Thus Mr. Osgood would have us be right for the wrong reasons and by the wrong methods.