Who says A, must say B; who says B, must say C, and so it must go to the end of the sequence. But how painful it often is to come right out with those Bs and Cs! How tempting to stay on—to over-stay—with that uttered A!
Lyndon Johnson said his A on February 7 when he ordered the first air strikes against North Vietnamese targets. It was very much like the double-A of Harry Truman—April 1, 1948 on Berlin, June 25, 1950 on Korea—or John Kennedy’s belated A on Cuba, October 22, 1962. Each meant, simply translated, a message to the Communist enterprise: thus far, but no further. And when the enterprise saw that the two predecessors were serious, that they were going on to the Bs and Cs, it drew back at the gates to Western Europe, ground to a halt in northern Asia, pulled its missiles out of the Caribbean.




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