The Politics of Victory

CONSERVATIVES all know why the U.S. lost the Vietnam War— meddling civilian leaders handcuffed the military and prevented it from vigorously pursuing the victory that was there for the taking. The lesson has become an article of faith in conservative orthodoxy, and in the political culture more broadly: American generals should be left alone to make war as they see fit, protected from any interference from grasping, ill-informed, timid politicians.

Eliot A. Cohen makes a persuasive case in his excellent new book that there are three problems with this view of Vietnam: It is wrong as a factual matter; it blinds us to the lessons of history’s truly great wartime leaders; and it impedes America’s ability to fight successfully to this day. Cohen argues that, counter to the post-Vietnam conventional wisdom, war is inherently a political enterprise, and therefore requires the close supervision of political leaders.

About the Author

Rich Lowry

Rich Lowry is the editor in chief of National Review.

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CONSERVATIVES all know why the U.S. lost the Vietnam War— meddling civilian leaders handcuffed the military and prevented it from vigorously pursuing the victory that was there for the taking. The lesson has become an article of faith in conservative orthodoxy, and in the political culture more broadly: American generals should be left alone to make war as they see fit, protected from any interference from grasping, ill-informed, timid politicians.

Eliot A. Cohen makes a persuasive case in his excellent new book that there are three problems with this view of Vietnam: It is wrong as a factual matter; it blinds us to the lessons of history’s truly great wartime leaders; and it impedes America’s ability to fight successfully to this day. Cohen argues that, counter to the post-Vietnam conventional wisdom, war is inherently a political enterprise, and therefore requires the close supervision of political leaders.