Retreat in Lebanon

The malady was not physical: the U.S. was probably more than a match for the musketeers of the United Arab Republic. Nor was it a failure of the intellect—of analysis or vision. U.S. leaders had long understood that the Middle West was the immediate target of Soviet imperialism and that the Soviet tactic was infiltration and subversion by natives in non-Com- munist guises. And that Lebanon was the keystone of anti-Soviet resistance in the Middle East. But last week the hapless, tormented Colossus of the West was backing away again.

The tormentors, in this case, were several thousand Arab guerrillas incited to arms by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the United Nations. Nasser’s guerrillas because they were attacking strategic Lebanon through the “infiltration loophole” in the U.S. defense system. The United Nations because Dag Hammarskjold denied that even that was happening. Under the strain, U.S. policy began to collapse. Over the Fourth of July week-end, State Department officials—relieved that no one seemed to be remembering Secretary Dulles’ pledge to defend Lebanon by American armed intervention if necessary—groped for a “compromise” solution. The likeliest possibility, as many of them saw it: a successor to President Chamoun who would be acceptable to Nasser.

LB

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L. Brent Bozell Jr.

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The malady was not physical: the U.S. was probably more than a match for the musketeers of the United Arab Republic. Nor was it a failure of the intellect—of analysis or vision. U.S. leaders had long understood that the Middle West was the immediate target of Soviet imperialism and that the Soviet tactic was infiltration and subversion by natives in non-Com- munist guises. And that Lebanon was the keystone of anti-Soviet resistance in the Middle East. But last week the hapless, tormented Colossus of the West was backing away again.

The tormentors, in this case, were several thousand Arab guerrillas incited to arms by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the United Nations. Nasser’s guerrillas because they were attacking strategic Lebanon through the “infiltration loophole” in the U.S. defense system. The United Nations because Dag Hammarskjold denied that even that was happening. Under the strain, U.S. policy began to collapse. Over the Fourth of July week-end, State Department officials—relieved that no one seemed to be remembering Secretary Dulles’ pledge to defend Lebanon by American armed intervention if necessary—groped for a “compromise” solution. The likeliest possibility, as many of them saw it: a successor to President Chamoun who would be acceptable to Nasser.