The New Eugenics by Matt Ridley Better than the old.

We repeatedly warned administration officials about China’s intelligence objectives and its aggressive attack on the labs. By mid 1997, we were able to forecast Chinese targets and objectives, particularly in the area of nuclear-weapons codes, simulations, and databases. Not once were our warnings heeded; sadly, we subsequently learned that our nuclear secrets had been placed on unclassified computer systems at the labs that were highly vulnerable to outside computer attacks. Such attacks were occurring at an alarming rate. It was not until 1999 that FBI computer forensic experts uncovered the magnitude of the potential loss of our nuclear secrets through computer attacks.

The administration had been very slow in responding to our warnings. The FBI’s prosecution of the espionage case, formally underway since mid 1996, had been dilatory at best. Months went by with little or no FBI action; more than a year passed before the FBI even attempted to obtain technical coverage of the key suspect in the case. What the FBI did with the list of eleven other potential suspects provided to them by DOE in 1996 remains a mystery. We have since learned that the FBI missed numerous opportunities for breakthroughs in the case, largely through neglect and ineptitude.

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We repeatedly warned administration officials about China’s intelligence objectives and its aggressive attack on the labs. By mid 1997, we were able to forecast Chinese targets and objectives, particularly in the area of nuclear-weapons codes, simulations, and databases. Not once were our warnings heeded; sadly, we subsequently learned that our nuclear secrets had been placed on unclassified computer systems at the labs that were highly vulnerable to outside computer attacks. Such attacks were occurring at an alarming rate. It was not until 1999 that FBI computer forensic experts uncovered the magnitude of the potential loss of our nuclear secrets through computer attacks.

The administration had been very slow in responding to our warnings. The FBI’s prosecution of the espionage case, formally underway since mid 1996, had been dilatory at best. Months went by with little or no FBI action; more than a year passed before the FBI even attempted to obtain technical coverage of the key suspect in the case. What the FBI did with the list of eleven other potential suspects provided to them by DOE in 1996 remains a mystery. We have since learned that the FBI missed numerous opportunities for breakthroughs in the case, largely through neglect and ineptitude.