When discussing Soviet influence in France, American observers often commit the error of considering the existence of two branches of Soviet expansion only: the Communist Party and its organizations, and the Soviet intelligence machine. Little information is available on the latter form of penetration, and observers therefore base their conclusions on Party membership figures and the official Communist Party line. Such an approach occasionally leads to excessively encouraging inferences, for Communist Party membership in France has undoubtedly dropped since early postwar days, and the Party has lost many prominent militants.
Actually the situation deserves much more careful treatment. One should never forget that Soviet political strategy is founded on Lenin’s doctrine that, in addition to the legal machine, Communism must maintain an important unofficial force which must be regarded as of greater value to the Communist cause. Another point to bear in mind is the traditional policy favored by Russian diplomacy in France, which has been developed and expanded under the Soviet regime. This policy (followed, for example, by Rachkovski, agent of the Russian police department in the early part of the present century), in addition to the operation of an intelligence machine, always sought support through various unofficial contacts—e.g., with Masonic and financial circles.




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