The Weakest Front

Many of those who advocate our military withdrawal from Vietnam follow the example of Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau in stressing a plausible, seemingly hardheaded strategic argument. This makes no appeal to pacifist, defeatist or revolutionary principles — though its proponents of course reach the same practical conclusion as the pacifists, defeatists and revolutionaries. On the one hand, the reasoning goes, our national interest and security are not at stake in Southeast Asia. On the other, we cannot in any case control Southeast Asian developments; military intervention is bound to be costly, harmful and, in the long run, unsuccessful.

Still, accepting the argument at face value, let us consider the major premise—that the national interest and security are not at stake in Southeast Asia. (If they are not, there’s no reason to fight there even if we can win.) This premise is based on a superficial, too mechanistic idea of the national interest. Even in geopolitical terms, a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia—an unavoidable result of our withdrawal—would be a strategic catastrophe. Its consequence would be the loss of all bases and friendly ports in the western Pacific and South Seas, and the fold- back of our basic line of defense to our own Pacific coast. This would in turn mean ceding to the Communist powers domination of the entire region (including the Indian subcontinent) . On a global scale our defense would be left with little except the inflexible “strategic deterrent”— and Prof. Morgenthau, like so many other withdrawers, has ruled that out under the Better Red than Dead axiom.

JB

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James Burnham

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Many of those who advocate our military withdrawal from Vietnam follow the example of Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau in stressing a plausible, seemingly hardheaded strategic argument. This makes no appeal to pacifist, defeatist or revolutionary principles — though its proponents of course reach the same practical conclusion as the pacifists, defeatists and revolutionaries. On the one hand, the reasoning goes, our national interest and security are not at stake in Southeast Asia. On the other, we cannot in any case control Southeast Asian developments; military intervention is bound to be costly, harmful and, in the long run, unsuccessful.

Still, accepting the argument at face value, let us consider the major premise—that the national interest and security are not at stake in Southeast Asia. (If they are not, there’s no reason to fight there even if we can win.) This premise is based on a superficial, too mechanistic idea of the national interest. Even in geopolitical terms, a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia—an unavoidable result of our withdrawal—would be a strategic catastrophe. Its consequence would be the loss of all bases and friendly ports in the western Pacific and South Seas, and the fold- back of our basic line of defense to our own Pacific coast. This would in turn mean ceding to the Communist powers domination of the entire region (including the Indian subcontinent) . On a global scale our defense would be left with little except the inflexible “strategic deterrent”— and Prof. Morgenthau, like so many other withdrawers, has ruled that out under the Better Red than Dead axiom.