So Much Process, So Little Peace

Since 9/11, the West has waged a robust war on terrorism. One failed state that sheltered international terrorists, Afghanistan, was invaded and is currently being pacified. One rogue state that assisted terrorism (most notoriously by subsidizing Palestinian suicide bombers), Iraq, has been liberated and is now being reconstructed. And within the United States the government has adopted a firm stress on national security that has even included detaining people suspected of involvement in terrorism for immigration violations that might otherwise have been ignored or lightly punished.

While authorities rightly caution that the terrorists may still succeed in striking the occasional dramatic blow, perhaps killing or maiming thousands of innocent people, al-Qaeda looks weakened and in retreat—and this has led to a significant change in official Western attitudes to terrorism. Until now, the assumptions guiding Western policy in terrorist conflicts from Israel to Northern Ireland have been the liberal ones that terrorism is ineradicable, there is no military solution to it, negotiations with terrorist groups are therefore necessary, and ultimately political concessions to them will prove unavoidable. These assumptions led in turn to the popularity of the so-called “peace process” as an alternative to what were assumed to be endless anti-terrorist military campaigns. The Oslo accords, the Good Friday Agreement, and now the Mideast “road map” are all examples of the peace process. They are rooted in the assumption—not in itself unreasonable—that complex and intractable problems such as the Mideast conflict cannot be solved in a single bound: Each disputed item has to be separately negotiated, with the most difficult one left for last. This gives negotiators an incentive not to discard all their previous agreements when they finally reach the crucial issue.

About the Author

John O’Sullivan

John O’Sullivan is a senior fellow at National Review Institute and a contributing editor of National Review.

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Since 9/11, the West has waged a robust war on terrorism. One failed state that sheltered international terrorists, Afghanistan, was invaded and is currently being pacified. One rogue state that assisted terrorism (most notoriously by subsidizing Palestinian suicide bombers), Iraq, has been liberated and is now being reconstructed. And within the United States the government has adopted a firm stress on national security that has even included detaining people suspected of involvement in terrorism for immigration violations that might otherwise have been ignored or lightly punished.

While authorities rightly caution that the terrorists may still succeed in striking the occasional dramatic blow, perhaps killing or maiming thousands of innocent people, al-Qaeda looks weakened and in retreat—and this has led to a significant change in official Western attitudes to terrorism. Until now, the assumptions guiding Western policy in terrorist conflicts from Israel to Northern Ireland have been the liberal ones that terrorism is ineradicable, there is no military solution to it, negotiations with terrorist groups are therefore necessary, and ultimately political concessions to them will prove unavoidable. These assumptions led in turn to the popularity of the so-called “peace process” as an alternative to what were assumed to be endless anti-terrorist military campaigns. The Oslo accords, the Good Friday Agreement, and now the Mideast “road map” are all examples of the peace process. They are rooted in the assumption—not in itself unreasonable—that complex and intractable problems such as the Mideast conflict cannot be solved in a single bound: Each disputed item has to be separately negotiated, with the most difficult one left for last. This gives negotiators an incentive not to discard all their previous agreements when they finally reach the crucial issue.