Letter from the Continent

The guessing game about de Gaulle’s “suicide” continues. No doubt de Gaulle envisaged the possibility—if not the likelihood—of defeat. Fortunately it occurred when a man of his own choice, a leading figure in his party, could succeed him; at a time, also, when the Communist Party unjustly bears part of the onus for the Red May of 1968, and bears justly the onus of the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia; at a time, moreover, when a large sector of the French population dreads a return to anarchy, and the election of a man from the moderate Right to the presidency could safely be expected. Had de Gaulle waited for the end of his second term, conditions might have been much less favorable. One thing is absolutely certain: there was no compelling reason for de Gaulle to connect his future as President either to the referendum on regionalization of France (i.e., a revival of the old provinces) or the downgrading of the Senate.

A lot of energy was expended on getting a “oui” vote. First of all, every French citizen received a printed brochure informing him of the nature of the envisaged changes. This amazing document consisted of fifteen pages in the most subtle legal language, and it is my guess that not more than 5 per cent of the voters looked into it, not more than one-half of one per cent read it, and not five in ten thousand really understood it. The man in the street was asked to make a decision about a matter he could not possibly comprehend. In some cases certain sentimental feelings governed the decision, as shown by the surprisingly large number of no-votes in Nancy because Metz and not Nancy had been selected as the future capital of the Lorraine region. (This the citizens learned through the newspapers, not from the brochure.) But, such things aside, the average Frenchman did not really vote on regionalism and the Senate, but on de Gaulle. And here, with a slight majority, the vote was no.

EK

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Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn

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The guessing game about de Gaulle’s “suicide” continues. No doubt de Gaulle envisaged the possibility—if not the likelihood—of defeat. Fortunately it occurred when a man of his own choice, a leading figure in his party, could succeed him; at a time, also, when the Communist Party unjustly bears part of the onus for the Red May of 1968, and bears justly the onus of the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia; at a time, moreover, when a large sector of the French population dreads a return to anarchy, and the election of a man from the moderate Right to the presidency could safely be expected. Had de Gaulle waited for the end of his second term, conditions might have been much less favorable. One thing is absolutely certain: there was no compelling reason for de Gaulle to connect his future as President either to the referendum on regionalization of France (i.e., a revival of the old provinces) or the downgrading of the Senate.

A lot of energy was expended on getting a “oui” vote. First of all, every French citizen received a printed brochure informing him of the nature of the envisaged changes. This amazing document consisted of fifteen pages in the most subtle legal language, and it is my guess that not more than 5 per cent of the voters looked into it, not more than one-half of one per cent read it, and not five in ten thousand really understood it. The man in the street was asked to make a decision about a matter he could not possibly comprehend. In some cases certain sentimental feelings governed the decision, as shown by the surprisingly large number of no-votes in Nancy because Metz and not Nancy had been selected as the future capital of the Lorraine region. (This the citizens learned through the newspapers, not from the brochure.) But, such things aside, the average Frenchman did not really vote on regionalism and the Senate, but on de Gaulle. And here, with a slight majority, the vote was no.