The Strangling of the Cities

There are a number of converging perspectives through which to view the Grand Strategy of the Communist enterprise. Let us adjust our lens to one of special relevance at this juncture.

In China in 1927, the bloody finish of their premature adventures proved to the Communists that they were not strong enough to take power in the large Chinese cities by a rapid strategy of direct approach. Urban operations were thereafter limited to slow infiltration, subversion and other forms of psychopolitical warfare. Primary operations were shifted to the vast, less intensely organized countryside, where diffused action was always possible. The poor and illiterate peasants were malleable, and many of the landlords could be handled by corruption or terror. A defeat in the countryside could not be conclusive, and was easy to absorb. Defeats, in fact, more than victories, were the surest means for training, testing and hardening the activist cadres.

JB

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James Burnham

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There are a number of converging perspectives through which to view the Grand Strategy of the Communist enterprise. Let us adjust our lens to one of special relevance at this juncture.

In China in 1927, the bloody finish of their premature adventures proved to the Communists that they were not strong enough to take power in the large Chinese cities by a rapid strategy of direct approach. Urban operations were thereafter limited to slow infiltration, subversion and other forms of psychopolitical warfare. Primary operations were shifted to the vast, less intensely organized countryside, where diffused action was always possible. The poor and illiterate peasants were malleable, and many of the landlords could be handled by corruption or terror. A defeat in the countryside could not be conclusive, and was easy to absorb. Defeats, in fact, more than victories, were the surest means for training, testing and hardening the activist cadres.