Nuclear Tests: Hedge against Disaster

Last week’s reports from Geneva suggest that the negotiations on banning nuclear tests are breaking down. The Soviets evidently see advantages in calling off the talks for a while. The U. S. public position is one of disappointment—witness the President’s statement: “We very, very much want an agreement.” So that U. S. negotiators will presumably be on hand whenever the Kremlin wishes to make another effort.

For the moment, however, we have been granted a reprieve. It might be well to take the occasion to ask whether we had any business in Geneva in the first place. Part of the answer has been stated many times in national review: that national defense depends on our keeping ahead or at least abreast of the Soviets in nuclear armament; that tests are indispensable for perfecting existing weapons and developing new ones; that the best detection and inspection systems now known afford no guarantee that we would discover Soviet violations of an agreement to stop tests; that, in any event, resumption of U. S. testing after a Soviet violation would take many months; that therefore an agreement which we would observe and they might not could bring on national disaster.

LB

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L. Brent Bozell Jr.

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Last week’s reports from Geneva suggest that the negotiations on banning nuclear tests are breaking down. The Soviets evidently see advantages in calling off the talks for a while. The U. S. public position is one of disappointment—witness the President’s statement: “We very, very much want an agreement.” So that U. S. negotiators will presumably be on hand whenever the Kremlin wishes to make another effort.

For the moment, however, we have been granted a reprieve. It might be well to take the occasion to ask whether we had any business in Geneva in the first place. Part of the answer has been stated many times in national review: that national defense depends on our keeping ahead or at least abreast of the Soviets in nuclear armament; that tests are indispensable for perfecting existing weapons and developing new ones; that the best detection and inspection systems now known afford no guarantee that we would discover Soviet violations of an agreement to stop tests; that, in any event, resumption of U. S. testing after a Soviet violation would take many months; that therefore an agreement which we would observe and they might not could bring on national disaster.