Teddy’s Back

The evidence is now conclusive: Count Teddy not only in the race for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination but determined to go all out to get it, despite many in the liberal Democratic establishment who think he is out of his mind. Exhibit A, the avoirdupois factor: He’s lost twenty pounds, to regain the lean and photogenic look. Exhibit B, the hawk factor: Teddy is moving onto the Armed Services Committee. Exhibit C, the tour of Ethiopia and other famine zones of Africa by the Kennedy entourage. This had its humanitarian impulse, doubtless, but it also served his political ends. Also, Teddy figures prominently in the apartheid/disinvestment debate over South Africa; he leans toward punitive economic measures, a safe political posture for him and one that will stroke Democratic liberals. Finally, Exhibit D, Teddy’s calculated mantis dance with Jerry Falwell, which drew such admiring words, surprisingly, from the Baptist minister. It may not have gained Teddy many fundamentalist votes, but it at least blurred the target.

Of all the potential Democratic contenders, Kennedy has the most powerful political-action committee (PAC), which gives him a distinct competitive edge. His Fund for a Democratic Majority is headed by Paul Tully, the savvy longtime Kennedy heavyweight and political director of last year’s Mondale-Ferraro campaign. Teddy’s PAC has a donor list of well over 100,000 names, “a tremendous advantage” over anyone who waits until 1986 to enter the race, says William Carrick, Kennedy’s Senate staff political director. “No one else will be able to touch us.” he boasts. What makes PACs important is that individual contributions to federal candidates are limited to $1,000 per election, which means that contenders must have a large grid of small donors for the early money needed to underwrite direct-mail programs and consequent campaign operations. This factor proved to be critical to both the Reagan-Bush and the Mondale-Ferraro campaigns. Without that attention early in 1983 to donations of $250 or less (and the federal funds that matched them) Mondale would probably have “been out of the race by mid-March,” notes the Minnesotan’s former finance director, Tim Finchem.

JM

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John McLaughlin

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Ted Kennedy

Presidential Election

The evidence is now conclusive: Count Teddy not only in the race for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination but determined to go all out to get it, despite many in the liberal Democratic establishment who think he is out of his mind. Exhibit A, the avoirdupois factor: He’s lost twenty pounds, to regain the lean and photogenic look. Exhibit B, the hawk factor: Teddy is moving onto the Armed Services Committee. Exhibit C, the tour of Ethiopia and other famine zones of Africa by the Kennedy entourage. This had its humanitarian impulse, doubtless, but it also served his political ends. Also, Teddy figures prominently in the apartheid/disinvestment debate over South Africa; he leans toward punitive economic measures, a safe political posture for him and one that will stroke Democratic liberals. Finally, Exhibit D, Teddy’s calculated mantis dance with Jerry Falwell, which drew such admiring words, surprisingly, from the Baptist minister. It may not have gained Teddy many fundamentalist votes, but it at least blurred the target.

Of all the potential Democratic contenders, Kennedy has the most powerful political-action committee (PAC), which gives him a distinct competitive edge. His Fund for a Democratic Majority is headed by Paul Tully, the savvy longtime Kennedy heavyweight and political director of last year’s Mondale-Ferraro campaign. Teddy’s PAC has a donor list of well over 100,000 names, “a tremendous advantage” over anyone who waits until 1986 to enter the race, says William Carrick, Kennedy’s Senate staff political director. “No one else will be able to touch us.” he boasts. What makes PACs important is that individual contributions to federal candidates are limited to $1,000 per election, which means that contenders must have a large grid of small donors for the early money needed to underwrite direct-mail programs and consequent campaign operations. This factor proved to be critical to both the Reagan-Bush and the Mondale-Ferraro campaigns. Without that attention early in 1983 to donations of $250 or less (and the federal funds that matched them) Mondale would probably have “been out of the race by mid-March,” notes the Minnesotan’s former finance director, Tim Finchem.