Moscow Wins Heads or Tails

The cover of the Economist’s first issue following the outbreak of Phase IV of the Arab-Israeli war carried a picture of desert soldiers and the streamer, whatever happens is bad. The unconditioned assertion is not up to the Economist’s usual level of accuracy. By adding a small qualification, we may affirm the direct opposite: For the Soviet Union, whatever happens is good. There is no way for Moscow to lose this one.

Moscow’s victory did not depend on the battlefields. Whether it was win, lose, or draw for the Arab states that she was supplying with weapons, intelligence, guidance, and global political backing, Moscow was ahead. In fact, a clearcut Arab victory would probably not have been the best possible outcome for Moscow, because over the longer run it would have tended to reduce Arab dependency on Moscow’s beneficence. (Among nations, gratitude is a scarce commodity, and for that matter is not numbered among the virtues in Islamic doctrine, since Allah is the sole source of all good.) A total and permanent military victory of Israel over the entire Arab world is impossible. The most favorable finish for Phase IV—still analyzing, of course, from Moscow’s standpoint—would be short of conclusive, and this is apparently what Moscow is going to get.

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James Burnham

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The cover of the Economist’s first issue following the outbreak of Phase IV of the Arab-Israeli war carried a picture of desert soldiers and the streamer, whatever happens is bad. The unconditioned assertion is not up to the Economist’s usual level of accuracy. By adding a small qualification, we may affirm the direct opposite: For the Soviet Union, whatever happens is good. There is no way for Moscow to lose this one.

Moscow’s victory did not depend on the battlefields. Whether it was win, lose, or draw for the Arab states that she was supplying with weapons, intelligence, guidance, and global political backing, Moscow was ahead. In fact, a clearcut Arab victory would probably not have been the best possible outcome for Moscow, because over the longer run it would have tended to reduce Arab dependency on Moscow’s beneficence. (Among nations, gratitude is a scarce commodity, and for that matter is not numbered among the virtues in Islamic doctrine, since Allah is the sole source of all good.) A total and permanent military victory of Israel over the entire Arab world is impossible. The most favorable finish for Phase IV—still analyzing, of course, from Moscow’s standpoint—would be short of conclusive, and this is apparently what Moscow is going to get.