THE departure of the radical reformers from the Russian government may not be the end of an era, but it certainly entails a significant adjustment of Russia’s course. It is also a major defeat for the Clinton Administration—which bet heavily on the reformers and their erratic patron, President Boris Yeltsin. And in the process the ideological and temperamental shortcomings of the chief architect of the Administration’s policy, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, have been laid bare.
A longtime Friend of Bill, Strobe Talbott entered the Administration with impressive credentials as a Russian specialist. Typical of the liberal establishment, he also approached his new responsibilities with the unfortunate mindset of a moral certainty about America’s role and a great desire to do good around the globe combined with little regard for the sovereignty of other nations. As a result, this Administration acted as if it had all the answers for Russia, both politically and economically, and played favorites among Russia’s political figures. Ironically, while many in the United States saw the Clinton Administration as very pro-Russian, it had few friends in Russia itself, outside of radical reformers such as Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. Now that regime, and with it the United States’ Russia policy, have come a cropper.
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