My Lai and the State of the Army

Much emotion and a torrent of language have been provoked by the My Lai trials, a controversy that strikes deep at the moral nerve-ends of the nation. The moral issues presented by the massacre at My Lai have been almost exhaustively debated and the culpability of Lieutenant Cal ley and others examined from a variety of points of view. Less attention has been paid to the effects of this lamentable episode upon the American military establishment and the attitudes held by the American people regarding the effectiveness of its Armed Forces in fulfilling the grim necessities of national policy. The series of events triggered by the disclosure of the killings at My Lai are but one factor in a serious debilitation of the American Army and its ability to perform its increasingly unpleasant international assignments. It is a disquieting irony that the collapse of the proud traditions of the French army began with its galling frustrations in Indochina. The behavior of the French army in Algeria and its regrettable intervention in French politics must certainly be viewed against the background of injuries to its self-esteem and professional elan that resulted from its Indochinese misadventures. The shadow of Dienbienphu hung over the corruption of the French military service.

The soul-searching provoked by the Calley case is not a unique experience for a country to undergo. The United States finding itself an imperial power (and I use the phrase descriptively and not pejoratively) faces many of the cruel predicaments that have beset other nations so situated. Indeed, the national agony over the Indochina war is strikingly similar to the internal division and bitterness aroused in Britain as a result of the Boer War. Britain, as a matter of fact, provides numerous instructive comparisons concerning the problems, military and moral, that occur when a great power is involved with far-flung political and military commitments around the globe. Consider specific illustrations that in some respects parallel the current searching of the national conscience regarding 1’affaire Calley. One such incident involved the killing of the king of Delhi and his immediate family by Major Hodgson after the successful siege of Delhi during the Indian Mutiny. Hodgson, one of the most able of the British commanders, created a cause celebre by personally dispatching the royal family that spearheaded the Indian revolt. Hodgson was not tried for this act, although he was later cashiered from the service for a totally unrelated matter. Or, alternatively, think back to the political hornets’ nest stirred up by the death of “Chinese” Gordon in the Sudan and the entire matter of the “punitive expedition” to retake Khartoum.

DZ

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Donald Atwell Zoll

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Much emotion and a torrent of language have been provoked by the My Lai trials, a controversy that strikes deep at the moral nerve-ends of the nation. The moral issues presented by the massacre at My Lai have been almost exhaustively debated and the culpability of Lieutenant Cal ley and others examined from a variety of points of view. Less attention has been paid to the effects of this lamentable episode upon the American military establishment and the attitudes held by the American people regarding the effectiveness of its Armed Forces in fulfilling the grim necessities of national policy. The series of events triggered by the disclosure of the killings at My Lai are but one factor in a serious debilitation of the American Army and its ability to perform its increasingly unpleasant international assignments. It is a disquieting irony that the collapse of the proud traditions of the French army began with its galling frustrations in Indochina. The behavior of the French army in Algeria and its regrettable intervention in French politics must certainly be viewed against the background of injuries to its self-esteem and professional elan that resulted from its Indochinese misadventures. The shadow of Dienbienphu hung over the corruption of the French military service.

The soul-searching provoked by the Calley case is not a unique experience for a country to undergo. The United States finding itself an imperial power (and I use the phrase descriptively and not pejoratively) faces many of the cruel predicaments that have beset other nations so situated. Indeed, the national agony over the Indochina war is strikingly similar to the internal division and bitterness aroused in Britain as a result of the Boer War. Britain, as a matter of fact, provides numerous instructive comparisons concerning the problems, military and moral, that occur when a great power is involved with far-flung political and military commitments around the globe. Consider specific illustrations that in some respects parallel the current searching of the national conscience regarding 1’affaire Calley. One such incident involved the killing of the king of Delhi and his immediate family by Major Hodgson after the successful siege of Delhi during the Indian Mutiny. Hodgson, one of the most able of the British commanders, created a cause celebre by personally dispatching the royal family that spearheaded the Indian revolt. Hodgson was not tried for this act, although he was later cashiered from the service for a totally unrelated matter. Or, alternatively, think back to the political hornets’ nest stirred up by the death of “Chinese” Gordon in the Sudan and the entire matter of the “punitive expedition” to retake Khartoum.