Music: Tales of Two Conductors

Watergate Story surface of American politics. The notion that the powers of the presidency should be narrowly construed vis-à-vis those of Congress, particularly on matters of war and peace, was first advanced by the Anti-Federalists and later endorsed by James Madison in a celebrated 1793 exchange with Alexander Hamilton. The framers of Article II, it is true, wrote with artful ambiguity, which is why we have been arguing about the proper scope of presidential discretion since 1789. But calculated ambiguity should not be confused with lack of purpose. They sought to avoid undue provocation of prevalent republican sentiment, which tended to favor legislative supremacy, but their goal was nevertheless clear: to create an independent, energetic executive vested with broad discretionary powers. The Anti-Federalists suspected as much but were unable to rouse sufficient opposition during the struggle over ratification.

The Anti-Federalist critique of Article II failed for two reasons. First, the executive office was in large part an expression of the virtues personified by George Washington. Although, as James Madison said, no constitution could guarantee that great statesmen would always be at the helm, the powers of the presidency were drafted capaciously, in order to attract great-souled men, whose singular talents might be necessary, especially in times of crisis or war. For many, if not most, critics of the Constitution, Washington’s character and reputation sufficed, at least for a time, to quiet reservations about the breadth of discretion delegated by the executive article. Once in office, Washington made clear that the nation’s chief executive was not meant to be a glorified errand boy for Congress.

About the Author

Jay Nordlinger

Jay Nordlinger was a senior editor of National Review and a book fellow at National Review Institute.

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Watergate Story surface of American politics. The notion that the powers of the presidency should be narrowly construed vis-à-vis those of Congress, particularly on matters of war and peace, was first advanced by the Anti-Federalists and later endorsed by James Madison in a celebrated 1793 exchange with Alexander Hamilton. The framers of Article II, it is true, wrote with artful ambiguity, which is why we have been arguing about the proper scope of presidential discretion since 1789. But calculated ambiguity should not be confused with lack of purpose. They sought to avoid undue provocation of prevalent republican sentiment, which tended to favor legislative supremacy, but their goal was nevertheless clear: to create an independent, energetic executive vested with broad discretionary powers. The Anti-Federalists suspected as much but were unable to rouse sufficient opposition during the struggle over ratification.

The Anti-Federalist critique of Article II failed for two reasons. First, the executive office was in large part an expression of the virtues personified by George Washington. Although, as James Madison said, no constitution could guarantee that great statesmen would always be at the helm, the powers of the presidency were drafted capaciously, in order to attract great-souled men, whose singular talents might be necessary, especially in times of crisis or war. For many, if not most, critics of the Constitution, Washington’s character and reputation sufficed, at least for a time, to quiet reservations about the breadth of discretion delegated by the executive article. Once in office, Washington made clear that the nation’s chief executive was not meant to be a glorified errand boy for Congress.