AMERICAN STRENGTH, SOVIET WILL

As dissatisfaction with detente rises, its defenders speak more and more in the tones of defeatism. Pro-detente arguments have begun to run like this: “The Soviets are emerging as the dynamic global power, with dominant military power. We could offset this trend by strong military, economic, and political actions, but the American people won’t support such policies. So our only hope is to decelerate our decline, i.e., make the best deal we can with the Soviets.” If this argument is correct, then everything I say from this point on is shouting into the wind. But I don’t think it is correct.

Underlying the current approach to the Soviet Union—the approach that has come to be known as detente—are some fallacious assumptions, which doomed it to defeat from its inception:

DG

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Daniel O. Graham

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As dissatisfaction with detente rises, its defenders speak more and more in the tones of defeatism. Pro-detente arguments have begun to run like this: “The Soviets are emerging as the dynamic global power, with dominant military power. We could offset this trend by strong military, economic, and political actions, but the American people won’t support such policies. So our only hope is to decelerate our decline, i.e., make the best deal we can with the Soviets.” If this argument is correct, then everything I say from this point on is shouting into the wind. But I don’t think it is correct.

Underlying the current approach to the Soviet Union—the approach that has come to be known as detente—are some fallacious assumptions, which doomed it to defeat from its inception: