Mexico City—An article published over the signature of Major Ernesto (Che) Guevara as a supplement to the Cuban Communist Party organ, Granma, dated April 16 of this year, advocated the creation of “two, three, many Vietnams” in the world as the best strategy for destroying “Yankee imperialism.” Guevara had particularly in mind Latin America, where “almost all the countries are ready” to follow the “road of Vietnam.” Citing Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela, he predicted that “new outbursts of war will surge up in these and other American countries, as has already happened in Bolivia.” Guevara, if it was really he who wrote the article, made special mention of Bolivia because at the time it was published guerrilla warfare had just begun there. On March 23, a six-man Bolivian Army patrol was ambushed by Communist guerrillas in a gorge in the jungle fastnesses of southeastern Bolivia. It was the opening of the newest guerrilla front in Latin America. That news, together with the serious events that have followed it, has unfortunately gone almost unreported in the American press. Yet it portends developments of great significance for all the Americas. Evidence accumulates that the guerrillas operating in southeastern Bolivia were organized and, until very recently at least, commanded by none other than Che Guevara himself. That seems to dispel the mystery of his absence from the public scene since April 1965. President René Barrientos of Bolivia told foreign journalists on July 1 that rumors of Che Guevara’s presence in Bolivia had been confirmed. His Armed Forces Chief, General Alfredo Ovando, stated categorically: “Although I believed that Che Guevara was dead, now I know he is in Bolivia directing the bloody orgies to which the Castro-Communist guerrillas are accustomed.” Two foreigners arrested near guerrilla territory, a French Castro-Communist, Régis Debray, and an Argentine adventurer who is possibly also a Communist, Carlos Alberto Bustos, have both corroborated the Barrientos-Ovando statements about Guevara. Though Debray subsequently contradicted himself, he first told military interrogators that he had seen and talked with Guevara on March 6, and added that he believed that Guevara had entered Bolivia last November. “I saw Che Guevara among the guerrillas,’ Bustos said.
Guevara’s leadership of the guerrillas in southeastern Bolivia gives them a significance far beyond the ordinary. He had undertaken that role, Debray says, to create on the South American continent “un foco insurreccional”—“‘a focus of insurrection”—in the Argentine-born guerrilla’s own phrase. Guevara explained, according to Debray: “I do not feel responsible for what must be done in Cuba because I am not a Cuban. My interest is in organizing the liberation of all Latin America.” Guevara told Debray that he would remain in Bolivia ten years, if necessary, to accomplish that purpose. The Argentine’s intention in establishing “a focus of insurrection” in Bolivia was, in short, to commence the task set forth in his April article of creating “two, three, many Vietnams.” The Bolivian government is fully aware of Guevara’s objective. In an urgent nationwide broadcast on June 26, President Barrientos stated that Bolivia “is in a state of international war well-prepared and well-financed by Communist cells.” More objective persons than Barrientos agree in characterizing the guerrilla activity in his country as an “international war.’ A New York Times dispatch from Buenos Aires, dated May 6, quoted a “high-ranking [American] military source” as follows: “We do know enough to draw the conclusion that the guerrillas are getting support from international Communist groups and from Cuba… .”




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