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The Treaty Trap _ By Laurence W. Beilenson : Public Affairs Press, $7 Like any other informed Washingto_ mian, Mr. Nixon probably knows two _ elementary facts: 1) To secure the United States against nuclear blackmail _ or attack, we need “sufficient superiority” in the quality and quantity of our Strategic weapons. 2) To avoid catastrophe in Asia, the Hanoi dictatorship must be so disabled that it cannot continue aggression. _ The country is in one of its escapist _ periods, however, and American adults believe in treaty-magic more firmly than American children believe in the stork. Ritualistic chants for a negotiated peace to change an undefeated _ and unreconciled enemy into a lasting _ friend are ringing through the country, and the President has consequently – avoided embarking upon a really effec_ tive strategy. The survival interests of the United States require that the treaty myth be destroyed. It is shocking to discover that Laurence W. Beilenson is the first person who has ever investigated the performance and utility of political treaties. He has examined 981 United States and _ European treaties concluded between 1661 and 1965, including open and secret pacts of alliance and collective security, disarmament and antisubversion agreements; determined how often they were broken by one or more of the signatories; and evaluated the consequences of the breaches in relation to each treaty’s objectives. Original sources are meticulously cited in the thorough work on these nearly one thousand treaties, and the evidence on — each breach is carefully documented— a truly heroic bibliographical achievement. THE CONCLUSION from this operations analysis is simple and terrifying: treaties are utterly unreliable. There has been “universal regularity of breaches in every age by nations with all forms of government, embracing the entire spectrum of ideologies, and led by statesmen of widely varying characters. . . . Because in all human experience there have been deviations from the norm, it is inaccurate to say ‘always,’ but the norm of observance of political treaties has been breach.” To put the author’s basic finding in my own words: the chances that a promissory treaty will be observed as intended, and will not prove to be a snare, are somewhere between 1:100 and 1:1000. Mr. Beilenson’s work could have included an additional chapter showing how the United States, a self-styled champion of international law, again, again and again has acquiesced in breaches of treaties to which it has “solemnly” appended its signature; for example, the UN Charter. Treaties should be regarded as an exceptional, not as a regular tool of foreign policy. Yet there is an amazing tendency, almost a compulsive obsession, to rely on treaties. “Treaty reliance . . . can be classified as an occupational disease of a statesman.” I happen to be writing at this moment from Asia, where people are more worried than in the self-pitying, neo-isolationist United States, and I want to supplement the record Mr. Beilenson has presented. France concluded two treaties bearing on Vietnam and offered one advantageous peace settlement to Ho Chi Minh. In 1954, Ho abused French “goodwill” by using the opening of the Geneva conference as a cover for the battle-of Dienbienphu — and the invasion of Laos. Subsequently, the Geneva agreements were systematically violated by Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, all parties to the instrument. Peking and Moscow were supposed to guarantee the arrangement; actually, they have been supporting Ho’s breaches of the peace since 1950. In Laos, four unsuccessful experiments at coalition government were tried be- : tween 1959 and 1964, including the — agreement of 1962 cosigned by Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. THE CHINESE CATASTROPHE of 1949 : was preceded by seven major American q policy declarations and treaties (beginning in 1899); by six major Soviet policy announcements and treaties (be ginning in 1918 and not counting agreements dealing with Mongolia and Sinkiang); by three major attempts 10 — establish a coalition between the Kuo- . mintang and the Chinese Communist —

Party; by five attempts between the CCP and KMT to negotiate military cooperation against Japan; and by three U.S.-imposed armistices between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces. Coalition governments and armistices with Communists did not work; arrangements for mutual supervision never functioned; and agreements with Communists invariably harmed the United States and its Far Eastern allies. But it wasn’t all the Communists’ fault. A “distinguished list of American statesmen” and Presidents have “participated in substantial breaches of treaties of the United States.” In Asia, the United States has all too often vacillated. For example, between 1946 and 1961 the American attitude on Vietnam and Southeast Asia swung back and forth at least four times. The United States often failed to live up to the spirit of its commitments and, in order to placate vocal opposition at home, repeatedly resorted to phony diplomatic arrangements. In so doing, it has inflicted terrible sacrifices on its Asian friends and on itself, and exposed both to great perils. Americans should not be surprised if Washington’s promises are met with considerable skepticism. Mr. Beilenson, of course, does not propose that the practice of treaty-making be abolished. Peace treaties, for example, are indispensable. What he does propose are objective tests to determine the performance expectancy of each treaty under consideration. If those tests raise grave doubts, the treaty should not be concluded. The United States should be able to avoid falling into the “treaty trap” by making treaties selectively and sparingly, and by assuming that major breaches will occur sooner rather than later. If these assumptions are kept in mind, if American power and freedom of action are not sacrificed, and if specific treaties are concluded to provide solid, albeit temporary advantages, American diplomacy might graduate from rhetoric and illusion to effectiveness.

SP

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Stefan T. Possony

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The Treaty Trap _ By Laurence W. Beilenson : Public Affairs Press, $7 Like any other informed Washingto_ mian, Mr. Nixon probably knows two _ elementary facts: 1) To secure the United States against nuclear blackmail _ or attack, we need “sufficient superiority” in the quality and quantity of our Strategic weapons. 2) To avoid catastrophe in Asia, the Hanoi dictatorship must be so disabled that it cannot continue aggression. _ The country is in one of its escapist _ periods, however, and American adults believe in treaty-magic more firmly than American children believe in the stork. Ritualistic chants for a negotiated peace to change an undefeated _ and unreconciled enemy into a lasting _ friend are ringing through the country, and the President has consequently – avoided embarking upon a really effec_ tive strategy. The survival interests of the United States require that the treaty myth be destroyed. It is shocking to discover that Laurence W. Beilenson is the first person who has ever investigated the performance and utility of political treaties. He has examined 981 United States and _ European treaties concluded between 1661 and 1965, including open and secret pacts of alliance and collective security, disarmament and antisubversion agreements; determined how often they were broken by one or more of the signatories; and evaluated the consequences of the breaches in relation to each treaty’s objectives. Original sources are meticulously cited in the thorough work on these nearly one thousand treaties, and the evidence on — each breach is carefully documented— a truly heroic bibliographical achievement. THE CONCLUSION from this operations analysis is simple and terrifying: treaties are utterly unreliable. There has been “universal regularity of breaches in every age by nations with all forms of government, embracing the entire spectrum of ideologies, and led by statesmen of widely varying characters. . . . Because in all human experience there have been deviations from the norm, it is inaccurate to say ‘always,’ but the norm of observance of political treaties has been breach.” To put the author’s basic finding in my own words: the chances that a promissory treaty will be observed as intended, and will not prove to be a snare, are somewhere between 1:100 and 1:1000. Mr. Beilenson’s work could have included an additional chapter showing how the United States, a self-styled champion of international law, again, again and again has acquiesced in breaches of treaties to which it has “solemnly” appended its signature; for example, the UN Charter. Treaties should be regarded as an exceptional, not as a regular tool of foreign policy. Yet there is an amazing tendency, almost a compulsive obsession, to rely on treaties. “Treaty reliance . . . can be classified as an occupational disease of a statesman.” I happen to be writing at this moment from Asia, where people are more worried than in the self-pitying, neo-isolationist United States, and I want to supplement the record Mr. Beilenson has presented. France concluded two treaties bearing on Vietnam and offered one advantageous peace settlement to Ho Chi Minh. In 1954, Ho abused French “goodwill” by using the opening of the Geneva conference as a cover for the battle-of Dienbienphu — and the invasion of Laos. Subsequently, the Geneva agreements were systematically violated by Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, all parties to the instrument. Peking and Moscow were supposed to guarantee the arrangement; actually, they have been supporting Ho’s breaches of the peace since 1950. In Laos, four unsuccessful experiments at coalition government were tried be- : tween 1959 and 1964, including the — agreement of 1962 cosigned by Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. THE CHINESE CATASTROPHE of 1949 : was preceded by seven major American q policy declarations and treaties (beginning in 1899); by six major Soviet policy announcements and treaties (be ginning in 1918 and not counting agreements dealing with Mongolia and Sinkiang); by three major attempts 10 — establish a coalition between the Kuo- . mintang and the Chinese Communist —

Party; by five attempts between the CCP and KMT to negotiate military cooperation against Japan; and by three U.S.-imposed armistices between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces. Coalition governments and armistices with Communists did not work; arrangements for mutual supervision never functioned; and agreements with Communists invariably harmed the United States and its Far Eastern allies. But it wasn’t all the Communists’ fault. A “distinguished list of American statesmen” and Presidents have “participated in substantial breaches of treaties of the United States.” In Asia, the United States has all too often vacillated. For example, between 1946 and 1961 the American attitude on Vietnam and Southeast Asia swung back and forth at least four times. The United States often failed to live up to the spirit of its commitments and, in order to placate vocal opposition at home, repeatedly resorted to phony diplomatic arrangements. In so doing, it has inflicted terrible sacrifices on its Asian friends and on itself, and exposed both to great perils. Americans should not be surprised if Washington’s promises are met with considerable skepticism. Mr. Beilenson, of course, does not propose that the practice of treaty-making be abolished. Peace treaties, for example, are indispensable. What he does propose are objective tests to determine the performance expectancy of each treaty under consideration. If those tests raise grave doubts, the treaty should not be concluded. The United States should be able to avoid falling into the “treaty trap” by making treaties selectively and sparingly, and by assuming that major breaches will occur sooner rather than later. If these assumptions are kept in mind, if American power and freedom of action are not sacrificed, and if specific treaties are concluded to provide solid, albeit temporary advantages, American diplomacy might graduate from rhetoric and illusion to effectiveness.