There are two key problems with the idea of a negotiated end to the stand-off with North Korea. First, a negotiated settlement requires us to believe that Kim Jong Il actually means to drop his nuclear program in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees. That is very unlikely. Kim is far more likely to believe that, no matter what we offer, he cannot guarantee his own power without nuclear weapons. Second, any agreement we might reach is essentially unverifiable. There are too many secret underground military facilities in Korea. We don’t even know where the uranium enrichment plant the North Koreans have admitted to having actually is. Kim would never give us the sort of free run of his military installations we’d need for verification. Even if he did, he could still hide something from us. Those who advocate a negotiated solution need to confront this problem. Today’s Op-Ed in the New York Times by James Laney and Jason T. Shaplen avoids the issue. They assume that a negotiated settlement is achievable, without even addressing the verification problem. By contrast, this pro-negotiation piece in the American Prospect at least acknowledges the problem. But the authors essentially concede that it is not solvable. North Korea has already broken one agreement. No matter what we offer it, I believe that it will break another. And we won’t know it until it’s too late. In any case, next time you read a pro-negotiated settlement piece on North Korea, look for any mention of the verification problem. That is the real sticking point. Without a solution there, negotiations are just an illusion.