Oh What a Small War

WHEN George W. Bush became president, academics and policymakers alike fretted that his election signaled a “return to isolationism.” That the United States was isolationist until the early part of the 20th century, and that even afterward isolationism remained the default preference of the American people, are among the things that “everyone knows.” Everyone also “knows” that the traditional purpose of the U.S. military has been to fight and win the nation’s wars in defense of vital national interests, and that the sort of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in which the U.S. military has been involved since the end of the Cold War constitute “non-traditional” missions. Finally, they “know” that the “American Way of War” seeks to annihilate the enemy, relies on technology and firepower to reduce U.S. casualties, requires the services of “citizen soldiers,” and has as its goal total victory in conventional wars against other states.

But as the Wall Street Journal’s Max Boot illustrates in this remarkable new book, when it comes to the history of U.S. foreign policy, Will Rogers was right when he claimed that “it’s not the things we don’t know that get us into trouble. It’s the things we know that just ain’t true.” The real history of U.S. policy has been, from the very beginning, about as far removed from these shibboleths as one can imagine.

About the Author

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Mackubin Thomas Owens is a senior national security fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute , editing its journal Orbis from 2008 to 2020. A Marine Corps infantry veteran of the Vietnam War, he was a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College from 1987 to 2015. He is the author of US Civil–Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain.

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WHEN George W. Bush became president, academics and policymakers alike fretted that his election signaled a “return to isolationism.” That the United States was isolationist until the early part of the 20th century, and that even afterward isolationism remained the default preference of the American people, are among the things that “everyone knows.” Everyone also “knows” that the traditional purpose of the U.S. military has been to fight and win the nation’s wars in defense of vital national interests, and that the sort of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in which the U.S. military has been involved since the end of the Cold War constitute “non-traditional” missions. Finally, they “know” that the “American Way of War” seeks to annihilate the enemy, relies on technology and firepower to reduce U.S. casualties, requires the services of “citizen soldiers,” and has as its goal total victory in conventional wars against other states.

But as the Wall Street Journal’s Max Boot illustrates in this remarkable new book, when it comes to the history of U.S. foreign policy, Will Rogers was right when he claimed that “it’s not the things we don’t know that get us into trouble. It’s the things we know that just ain’t true.” The real history of U.S. policy has been, from the very beginning, about as far removed from these shibboleths as one can imagine.

About the Author

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Mackubin Thomas Owens is a senior national security fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute , editing its journal Orbis from 2008 to 2020. A Marine Corps infantry veteran of the Vietnam War, he was a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College from 1987 to 2015. He is the author of US Civil–Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain.