China’s growth has not only been good for China, it has been good for the world. The Chinese middle class now numbers about 400 million, with so many lifted from poverty in the process. China’s growth has been good, economically, for Australia. As the Chinese people have risen out of poverty over the past 40 years, Australia has been a reliable partner in powering and feeding their growing cities. In challenging times, China’s stimulus spending relies on firing up its state-owned steel mills to build infrastructure, with few options other than to be fueled by Australian iron ore and coal. This was of particular value for Australia when the global financial crisis hit more than ten years ago.

Our complementary economic relationship and strong people-to-people links, with 5 percent of Australians being of Chinese heritage, are the foundations of what was until recently, and despite our manifest political and cultural differences, quite a positive relationship. Some commentators have attributed the recent deterioration in the relationship to certain actions taken by the Australian government. This ignores the factor common to China’s worsening relationships across the world. That is the growing authoritarianism of Xi Jinping at home and abroad.

Australia, though, has been the prime target of China’s economic coercion since mid 2019. China had hoped that by targeting, with a variety of measures, our wine, barley, beef, cotton, lobster, and coal, and making threats to other industries, it could pressure the Australian business community to be more compliant. This has not happened. The Australian economy thus far has rebounded from COVID-19 and is projected by the International Monetary Fund to grow by 4.5 percent in 2021.

China’s specific actions against some of our exports, and a more belligerent diplomatic tone, have altered the view of the Australian people and their political leaders and produced a major collapse of goodwill toward China in recent years. Indeed, only 12 percent of Australians when surveyed in 2018 by the Lowy Institute said Beijing was more of a security threat than an economic partner; this has dramatically increased to 63 percent in 2021. While there may be a nationalist constituency in China for punitive measures against a generality of countries, such actions are contrary to the interests of Beijing. They have stimulated a growing consensus against China across the democratic world.

The main achievement of China’s so-called wolf-warrior diplomacy has been to unite Republicans and Democrats against it. This has led to the classification of China by the U.S. as a near-peer competitor, resulting in technology controls as well as trade sanctions and tariffs. I believe that it is because of these policies out of Washington, more so than any out of Canberra, that Beijing is targeting Australia. It is a means of retaliation against the U.S. that avoids direct confrontation. Some might say we have become a proxy punching bag.

During my time as prime minister, I always found that the Chinese leaders I dealt with understood Australia’s shared history and values with the U.S. and why we therefore enjoy such a close relationship. The Chinese line has been that Australia always follows America because we share the same position on so many issues. Rather, it is because Australia and the U.S. share the same values that we so often share the same position.

Australia–China relations are now supposedly at a low point because Canberra demonstrated an independent foreign-policy initiative when it publicly called for an inquiry into COVID-19, even though it was widely recognized as being obviously required.

Such narrow analysis ignores the fact that ministerial and diplomatic meetings between Australia and China have been largely frozen since 2017, after the Australian government proposed foreign-interference legislation to protect the Australian community, including those with a Chinese background. Then, in 2018, the Australian government was the first country to formally ban Huawei from its 5G network on national-security grounds — a decision subsequently made by many countries, including the U.S. and the U.K.

China remains Australia’s best export destination, and the human links are quite extensive. Australia’s higher-grade iron ore and coal have helped build Chinese cities while improving their air quality. Chinese families trust Australian universities to educate their sons and daughters. The quality of our produce is also well regarded by China’s continually growing middle class. Paradoxically, the greatest beneficiaries of China’s trade war against Australia have been American farmers and coal miners. The Chinese people also miss out on Australia’s wine; and China’s most recognizable beer, Tsingtao, no longer is able to use its preferred Australian barley.

One of the United States’ greatest strengths is its network of allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Some Australian academic and media commentators endlessly argue that Australia has an acute problem in that its main trading partner is China while its security guarantor is the U.S. This is not unique; this is the position of every U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific. Australia and other U.S. allies should continue to seek cooperation with China when it is sensible to do so. An example was that of Australia’s joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank despite arguments to the contrary mounted by the Obama administration. Pragmatism and principle should always be balanced.

We should avoid the false-choice argument. It simply does not arise. Australia will always be closer to the U.S. than to China because of our commonality of values. In all my interactions with China some years ago, this was understood. There were never any suggestions that Australia had to make a choice. That of course was before Xi Jinping.

The Xi regime has been clumsy in its treatment of otherwise fairly friendly or neutral countries in Europe. China had hoped Brussels could be a potential partner or at least another center of power to balance against the U.S. Instead, China has overreacted to mild European criticism of its conduct in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, targeting members of the Euro­pean Parliament, which then blocked the planned EU–China investment deal. This has strengthened the transatlantic relationship, a process that will only accelerate once Angela Merkel leaves office.

China, on the other hand, has only one treaty ally, in North Korea, and has a temporary alignment of interests with Russia; but it has its closest relationship with Pakistan. It is perhaps then with some irony that despite Chinese media agencies and foreign-affairs spokesmen characterizing Australia as being unfriendly, an opinion survey by the Beijing Foreign Studies University this year found that Chinese citizens still ranked Australia in fourth place when asked which country they thought was “China’s best friend,” behind only those three previously named.

I have long warned about the dangers of being mesmerized by China. China has two long-term challenges. The first of these is demography; because of China’s ill-judged one-child policy, China will now grow old before she grows rich. This policy alone should dispel the myth of Chinese politicians as long-term thinkers who believe in the inevitability of China’s dominance. The second issue is the nature of authoritarianism. My belief is that if you are born into poverty and transition to relative comfort in your lifetime, you may well put up with being told what to do. As has been demonstrated in Hong Kong and Taiwan, those who have known a middle-class existence all their lives are less likely to accept being told what to do.

As Beijing’s behavior has intensified since COVID-19, I am now also concerned that people and nations have been startled by China. This change has shocked many who had expected China to become more like the West, and there is now a danger in overreacting to the perceived threat of China. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind China’s precarious security situation when considering any direct military threat against either Australia or the U.S.

China has the world’s longest land border, with 14 neighboring countries, and with its main economic and population centers on the coast of a sea it does not control. It is preoccupied with independence movements on its periphery, the potential collapse of North Korea, growing tensions with India, as well as territorial claims against a number of countries in the East and South China Seas.

For these and other reasons, Beijing is highly unlikely to take military action against the U.S. unless it feels it is vital for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain power. The situation of Taiwan is more problematic. Obviously, an overt declaration of independence by Taiwan would provoke a direct Chinese response. That is why U.S. administrations have in recent years counseled Taiwan against such action. It should always be recognized that, in large measure because of the nationalism fostered in China, any defeat could mean the end of the CCP.

The center of gravity of the rivalry may not necessarily become predominantly a military one in the straits or seas in the vicinity of China, but rather continue to be economic and political. China’s competition with the Anglosphere countries (read Five Eyes) such as Australia is a particular priority because these nations have attracted the largest proportion of Chinese-speaking immigrants outside of Asia. This is only likely to grow with the latest exodus out of Hong Kong. Countries such as Australia should then continue to demonstrate the best that liberal democracy has to offer: a commitment to free markets, civil and political rights, and political exchange that sometimes criticizes other countries.

The greatest exemplar of such principles has always been the U.S. Americans should not, therefore, make the mistake of thinking China will overwhelm them. For the reasons I have outlined, and others, the United States will remain the most powerful nation in the world for the foreseeable future.